The IDF’s invasion of Gaza unlikely to achieve war goals, return hostages

Without perfecting hostages and on Hamas hidden fighters in Gaza City, FDI controlling more land is probably not obtained to achieve strategic objectives.

There is an integrated dilemma which seems to hinder the current invasion of the city of Gaza, just as it has circumscribed the impact of previous invasions.

In March, Israel hoped that a new strategy of conquering the territory in Gaza would more stress in Hamas than “only” having beat its 24 battalions with the penetrated strategy and the transplant that it had used during the war to this point.

In addition, Israel hoped that more of the main leaders of Hamas who were not yet dead – there are not much left – would like to live more than their predecessors, which happened with Hezbollah.

This did not work this way, and the same problems that Israel has encountered since March should afflict the last invasion of Gaza City, which started last week.

It turned out that even once Israel began to take over a large part of the territory of Gaza – which emasculated Hamas in many ways in the extent that he wanted to present himself as governing the gang – the leaders of Hamas knew that as long as Israel would not endanger the 20 living hostages, they retained their lever effect.

What is Hamas confronted with in the Gaza offensive?

In other words, the loss of territory injured their political control over the Gazans to a certain extent, but it was not decisive. Only the maintenance of the hostages was decisive. Thus, Hamas could stick to its same requirements concerning the end of the war, whatever its loss of territory.

Meanwhile, its rare remaining leaders and all the new younger leaders who were previously intermediate management still do not seem to worry about dying as long as “the cause” continues and they keep the hostages.

If Israel hoped that the painful image of exploding some huge buildings of Gaza City would bring Hamas to his senses and would recognize that it is a fight that he cannot win, weeks have passed since that started without change in the position of Hamas.

If Hamas was not ready to abandon the lever effect of its hostages to avoid losing three buildings or six buildings, why would it abandon this lever effect for dozens of buildings?

Hamas is also extremely stressed by the civilian population of Gazan forced to leave the city of Gaza.

He is concerned about having to work harder to maintain the population online and be blamed for this last loss of one of the rare remaining parts of the pre-war Gaza which is still standing.

But Hamas has succeeded again and again.

At the end of the day, to keep control in the band, he does not need to keep the population of Gazan happy; He just needs to keep enough pistols to keep them too frightened to get up to overturn him.

This helps that around 700,000 of the two million gas is very ideologically associated with Hamas, even if only a fraction of those who participate in the fighting.

There could be another point of stress in the invasion of the city of Gaza.

The FDIs could finally locate the 2,000 to 2,500 fighters from Hamas with a hard core and perhaps some of the other largest groups of less committed Hamas terrorists and kill them.

But it is unlikely that it will happen, because the FDIs do not check the Gazans while they flee Gaza City.

While around 500,000 Gazans who have left in recent weeks, most Hamas fighters have probably already fled.

On a daily basis, the FDI provides detailed updates to Gaza City.

But if from the end of 2023 to the summer of 2024, such updates could speak of killing hundreds or dozens of Hamas terrorists in one day, for all 2025, TDI messages often speak of killing a few terrorists at the same time or seizing weapon caches without even killing terrorists.

This will not really decimate or defeat the remaining forces of Hamas, who decided more than a year ago to wait for their time by hiding and venturing only when he was sure – when the FDI forces take a break – to perform a guerrilla war.

For a while, it seemed clear that the hostages could be released with an agreement, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejecting the return of 10 hostages for a 60 -day break last month. Or the FDI could send special forces to all hostage locations known simultaneously and hope for lucky rescues, but be ready for the worst.

These seem to be two ways to end the confrontation hostage. If Israel is not willing to choose one of these two choices, Hamas will keep the lever effect of its hostages.

In terms of Hamas defect, Israel can either examine carefully and treat the entire civilian population in order to sniff the terrorists from the remaining Hamas, or this can end the war, but keep enough soldiers who weigh Gaza regularly for a period of time to try to eliminate the military support of Hamas over time.

Neither is guaranteed to work and both are extremely difficult to implement.

In the absence of such strategies, Israel is unlikely to achieve its strategic objectives simply by taking up Gaza City.