Only Europe can save Ukraine from Putin and Trump – but will it? | Timothy Garton Ash

EEurope, you have been warned. President Vladimir Putin has been waging a full-scale war against Ukraine for nearly four years and threatened this week that Russia was “ready right now” for war with Europe if necessary. President Donald Trump has demonstrated that the United States is willing to sell out Ukraine in the name of a dirty deal with Putin’s Russia. Its new US National Security Strategy recommends “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations.” How much clarity do you need?

It is now up to us, Europeans, to allow Ukraine to survive Moscow’s armed attacks and Washington’s diplomatic betrayal. In doing so, we also defend ourselves. For the past year, I’ve been told that Trump will eventually get tough on Russia. It’s the geopolitical version of Waiting for Godot. Then his personal real estate emissaries propose a 28-point “peace plan” that is a Russian-American imperial and trade deal at the expense of Ukraine and Europe.

European leaders engage in their familiar Trump management mode, eliminating the most scandalous points through change-watch diplomacy to produce a version that – predictably – Russia in turn finds unacceptable. Even though this 28-point plan only lasted a few days, it deserves to be studied for a long time as a historical document. This reveals how far Trump’s United States is willing to go to return to a politics of empires and spheres of influence, above the heads of all Europeans. The old Polish rallying cry Nick o nas bez nas! (nothing about us without us!) must now rise from all over Europe.

Two questions follow. First, can Europe, along with like-minded countries like Canada, strengthen Ukraine enough and weaken Russia so that the former ultimately prevails? Second, right?

The answer to the first is that it will be very difficult, but we still can. If, at their December 18 summit, European leaders agree on a way to use frozen Russian assets held in Belgium, the gaping hole in Ukraine’s budget can be filled for at least the next two years. Europe’s combined economy is 10 times larger than Russia’s. European defense production is accelerating. The list of essential military products that only the United States can supply is getting shorter and shorter, and Trump’s profit-seeking logic means that most can still be purchased. Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Norway and Canada recently agreed to purchase an additional $1 billion worth of U.S. weapons for Ukraine. If Trump were to once again reduce US intelligence input, trying to blackmail Ukraine into accepting a surrender peace, it would be a major blow, but Ukrainian and European intelligence services can already fill in some gaps.

Ukraine itself has crucial duties to fulfill. The departure of President Volodymyr Zelensky’s right-hand man, Andriy Yermak, amid a major corruption scandal, creates an opportunity for Ukraine to carry out a bold domestic reset, perhaps in the form of a genuine government of national unity. The yellow and blue line of soldiers at the front becomes desperately thin. Since February 2022, prosecutors have opened nearly 300,000 cases for unauthorized absence or desertion, and many Ukrainians of military age are encountered outside the country.

But Russia is also experiencing growing problems. Cemeteries would be expanded to accommodate at least 250,000 war dead and, with perhaps 750,000 more wounded, recruitment becomes difficult, even for a dictatorship with a population far larger than Ukraine. The economy has been remarkably resilient so far, thanks to the revival of the “war economy” and thriving ties with China and India (witness this week’s romance between Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Delhi). But inflation is soaring, interest rates are above 16% and, above all, the price of oil is falling. Long-range Ukrainian attacks have damaged more than a third of Russian oil refineries. Around 80% of Russia’s maritime oil exports pass through the Danish Strait on “ghost fleet” ships that generally do not meet international safety and environmental standards. Europe could slow this flow of revenue by stopping and rigorously inspecting these ships.

If Europe manages to generate sufficient military and economic support for Ukraine and economic pressure on Russia, then at some point in 2026 or 2027 the incentive structure for Putin will change. His generals would tell him “we’re going nowhere” and his central bank would tell him “the economy is failing.” A ceasefire along the existing front line then becomes more likely. It is difficult to envision a formal peace treaty that Putin and Zelensky could agree to sign, but a longer-term truce is a realistic possibility.

Europe would then face a new challenge. Who wins this war will not be decided then, when the guns fall silent, but over the next five to ten years. If in 2030, in addition to occupying and Russifying a Ukrainian territory larger than the size of Portugal and Slovenia combined, Moscow can privately boast that the rest of Ukraine is uncertain, dysfunctional, demoralized, depopulated and subject to strong Russian influence, then Russia will have won. If in 2030 most of Ukraine is sovereign, secure, a “steel porcupine” capable of deterring any future Russian attack; whether it has a dynamic economy, attracting foreign investment, providing good jobs for veterans and persuading young Ukrainians to return from abroad; if it also has a half-decent democracy, a strong civil society and is seriously on track to become a member of the EU; then Ukraine will have won. But this will require a sustained and substantial effort from Europe, as well as from the Ukrainians themselves.

Yes, Europe can do it. But will it be? I can offer you a long list of reasons why this may not be the case. The still widespread myth of Russian invincibility. Learned helplessness after 80 years of dependence on the United States for our security. The procedural slowness of the EU. Acute competition for public money in European states that are often heavily indebted and with aging populations that have unrealistic expectations of what these states can provide. The kind of policy that is bringing Germany’s governing coalition to the brink of collapse over a proposed modest cut to the state pension system, which already swallows up a quarter of the federal budget. Domestic selfishness has seen the Belgian prime minister oppose the seizure of frozen Russian assets and France argue with Germany over a supposedly joint project for a next-generation fighter jet. Should I continue?

But to this pessimism of the intellect I place the optimism of the will. Because it is the only thing that can transform “Europe can” into “Europe will”. Will. Strategic determination. Fighting spirit. The courage to put long-term collective interest ahead of short-term political opportunities. We know that individual nations have accomplished extraordinary things against all odds in moments of existential danger: Britain in 1940, Ukraine in 2022. But will our diverse, complex and questionable continent be up to this major yet significantly less extreme challenge? Europe can if it wants.