China builds massive missile force to keep US out of Taiwan fight

China has spent decades building a land-based missile force designed to keep the United States out of a fight over Taiwan — and U.S. officials say it now threatens every major airfield, port and military installation in the Western Pacific.

As Washington races to build its own long-range fires, analysts warn that the land domain has become the most neglected – and potentially decisive – part of the US-China confrontation. Interviews with military experts show a competition defined not by tanks or troop movements, but by missile range, access to bases and whether U.S. forces can survive the opening salvos of a war that can begin long before a plane takes off.

“The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force… has built increasing numbers of short-, medium-, and long-range missiles,” Seth Jones of the Center for Strategic and International Studies told Fox News Digital. “They have the capability to fire on those crossing the first and, increasingly, the second island chain.”

For years, Chinese officials assumed they could not match the United States in air superiority. Rocket Force became the workaround: massive land-based firepower intended to shut down U.S. bases and keep U.S. planes and ships out of combat.

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“They didn’t think they could gain air superiority in direct air-to-air combat,” said Eric Heginbotham, a research scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “So you need another way to launch missiles, and that other way is to build a large number of ground launchers.”

“The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force…has built increasing numbers of short-, medium-, and long-range missiles,” Seth Jones of the Center for Strategic and International Studies told Fox News Digital. (CNS photo via Reuters)

The result is the world’s largest inventory of theater-range missiles, supported by hardened underground facilities, mobile launchers and rapid fire-and-move tactics designed to overwhelm U.S. defenses.

Despite China’s numerical advantage, U.S. forces still hold advantages that Beijing has yet to match, including in targeting and survivability.

American missiles, from Tomahawks to SM-6s to future hypersonic weapons, are linked to a global surveillance network that the People’s Liberation Army cannot yet replicate. U.S. targeting relies on satellites, underwater sensors, stealth drones and joint command tools developed over decades of combat experience.

“The Chinese haven’t fought a war since the 1970s,” Jones said. “We see many challenges to their ability to conduct joint operations between different services.”

The United States, by contrast, has built up multi-domain task forces in the Pacific to integrate cyber, space, electronic warfare and precision fires — a level of coordination that China has yet to demonstrate, analysts say.

Jones said China’s defense industry also faced major obstacles.

“Most (of China’s defense companies) are state-owned enterprises,” he said. “We’re seeing massive inefficiency, the quality of the systems… we’re seeing a lot of maintenance challenges.”

Yet the United States faces a short-term problem of its own: missile stockpiles.

“We would still be short (of long-range munitions) after about a week of conflict, for example in Taiwan,” Jones said.

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Washington is trying to close this gap by rapidly increasing its production of ground-launched weapons. The Army’s new systems – Typhon launchers, high-mobility artillery rocket systems, batteries, precision strike missiles and long-range hypersonic weapons with a range greater than 2,500 kilometers – are designed to put Chinese forces at risk from much further afield.

Heginbotham said change is finally happening on a large scale.

“We are buying anti-ship missiles like there is no tomorrow,” he said.

If current plans are confirmed, U.S. forces will deploy about 15,000 long-range anti-ship missiles by 2035, up from about 2,500 today.

China’s missile strategy is designed to overwhelm U.S. bases early in a conflict. The United States, meanwhile, relies on multi-tiered air defenses: Patriot batteries to protect airfields and logistics centers, Terminal High Altitude Defense (THAAD) interceptors to engage ballistic missiles at high altitudes, and Aegis-equipped destroyers that can intercept missiles far from shore.

Heginbotham warned that the United States will need to expand this defensive combination.

“We really need much more and more varied missile defense systems, and preferably cheaper missile defense systems,” he said.

A member of the People’s Liberation Army shows up as the Maritime Operations Group displays YJ-19 hypersonic anti-ship missiles during a military parade marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, in Beijing, China, September 3, 2025. (Tingshu Wang/Reuters)

One of Washington’s greatest advantages is its ability to carry out long-range strikes from the ocean floor. U.S. submarines can fire cruise missiles from virtually anywhere in the Western Pacific, without relying on allied bases and without exposing launchers to Chinese fire — a degree of stealth that China does not yet possess.

Command integration is another area where Beijing continues to struggle. U.S. units regularly train in multi-domain operations that combine air, maritime, cyber, space and land fires.

Jones and Heginbotham both noted that the People’s Liberation Army has far less experience coordinating forces across services and continues to struggle with doctrinal and organizational problems, including the dual commander and political commissar structure within its missile brigades.

Perhaps the most important difference is alliances. Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and South Korea provide depth, intelligence sharing, logistics centers, and potential launch points for U.S. forces.

China does not have a comparable network of partners, allowing it to operate from a much narrower geographic footprint. In missile warfare, precision, integration, and survivability often matter more than sheer volume – and in these areas the United States maintains significant advantages.

At the heart of this competition is geography. Missiles matter less than the locations from which they can be launched, and China’s ability to project power beyond its shores remains severely limited.

“They have major power projection issues right now,” Jones said. “They don’t have a lot of foundations when you go outside the first island chain.”

The United States faces its own version of this challenge. Long-range fire from the Army and Marine Corps requires authorization from the host nation, thereby transforming diplomacy into a form of firepower.

“It’s absolutely central,” Heginbotham said. “You need a regional base.”

Recent U.S. agreements with the Philippines, as well as expanded cooperation with Japan and Australia, reflect a desire to position U.S. launchers close enough to matter without permanently stationing significant ground forces there.

A land conflict between the United States and China would not involve maneuvering armored columns to gain territory. The decisive question is whether missile units on both sides can fire, move and fire again before being targeted.

China has invested heavily in survivability, dispersing its brigades across underground bunkers, tunnels and hardened sites. Many can lay off and move within minutes. Mobile launchers, decoys, and deeply buried storage complexes make them difficult to neutralize.

U.S. forces will deploy about 15,000 long-range anti-ship missiles by 2035, up from about 2,500 today. (Daniel Ceng/Anadolu via Getty Images)

U.S. launchers in the Pacific would face intense Chinese surveillance and long-range missile attacks. After two decades dedicated to fighting terrorism, the Pentagon is now reinvesting in deception, mobility and infrastructure hardening – capabilities critical to surviving the early stages of a missile war.

Any U.S. intervention in a conflict in Taiwan would also force Washington to confront a politically sensitive issue: whether to strike missile bases on the Chinese mainland. This would risk an escalation; avoiding it incurs operational costs.

“Yes… you can defend Taiwan without hitting bases in China,” Heginbotham said. “But you give a significant advantage.”

Restraint may help prevent the conflict from spreading, but it also allows China to keep firing.

“It’s a reality of conflict in the nuclear age: Almost all conflict will be limited in some way,” Heginbotham said. “The question then is where are these lines drawn: can you prevent their spread? What compromises are you prepared to accept?”

A ground clash between the United States and China would not be fought by massive armies. It would be a missile war shaped by geography, alliances and survivability – a competition where political access and command integration matter as much as raw firepower.

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For the United States, the challenge is clear: build enough long-range missiles, secure the bases necessary for their use, and keep the launchers alive under fire. For China, the question is whether its vast missile arsenal and continental depth can compensate for weaknesses in coordination, command structure and actual combat experience.

The side that can fire, move and sustain fire the longest will control the land domain – and can determine the outcome of a war in the Pacific.

This is the third installment in a series comparing U.S. and Chinese military capabilities. Feel free to check out previous stories comparing sea And air capabilities.