An international security expert analyzes regional impact of U.S.-Israel war on Iran : NPR

SCOTT SIMON, HOST:

It’s been a week since the United States and Israel started war against Iran. Today, at least nine other countries have been drawn into the conflict as Iran retaliates against its oil and gas facilities, as well as U.S. bases and embassies. Israel has also bombed sites in Lebanon. Hezbollah sent bombs to Israel. Today, Iran’s president said Iran regrets its strikes against neighboring countries and would suspend them if the attacks did not originate from those countries. What could develop in the region? Michael Wahid Hanna is director of the US program at the International Crisis Group. Thank you very much for being with us.

MICHAEL WAHID HANNA: It’s good to be with you.

SIMON: And we spoke in June when you had concerns about a broader regional war as the United States and Israel carried out limited strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. Is what we’ve seen over the last week playing out the way you thought it would?

HANNA: In many ways. I mean, I think when we spoke last June, I noticed how volatile the situation was and that there had already been fears that this might not be the end of the story. And what we’ve seen since the start of the US-Israeli war with Iran is this kind of regionalization of the conflict that I think has worried many of us for some time.

And in the previous cases, I think we avoided the worst-case scenarios, but this one seems very different. As you mentioned, countries in the region have been drawn into the fight. In some cases, they were the ones most targeted by Iran. And key US bases have been targeted. So it’s a very different situation than in June, when Iran, you know, telegraphed its retaliation and the war, at that point, after 12 days, ended quickly. And it’s hard to imagine this particular conflict following this kind of scenario.

SIMON: Could this war cause Middle Eastern countries to rethink their relations with the United States?

HANNA: It’s very possible. You know, I think we’ve heard a lot about the general crisis in air defense, the fact that air defenses are becoming depleted. So a big concern for the Gulf countries, in particular, who are facing so much fire coming from Iran, is that they’re going to run out of interceptors and lose the ability to protect themselves. And, of course, interceptors are incredibly rare. You know, Americans need it. Israelis need it. Other theaters need it. This is why the question of whether they will be able to protect themselves and their citizens is a major concern for them.

SIMON: In an online article, President Trump basically rejected the Iranian president’s statement today that Iran would refrain from attacking neighboring states unless they bomb Iran. What do you think of the president’s statement? Does he have enough power to do that?

HANNA: That’s a good question. I mean, I think I would be wary of taking it literally. Obviously, just yesterday we saw attacks against the Gulf countries. So I think it would be premature to assume that this is the start of a new direction. This would be a major de-escalation, but I’m frankly skeptical, given the way the war has been going, and I’m skeptical that this is actually the next step for Iran in terms of its retaliatory approach.

SIMON: And, Mr. Hanna, we’re seeing reports that the CIA may begin rearming Iraqi Kurdish groups and sending them to Iran. Do you think this is a possibility? What will be the effect? Do you think more non-state groups could get involved?

HANNA: Well, that’s definitely a possibility. We hear about it in the press, and there are indications on the ground that something is happening. You know, I wouldn’t want to exaggerate everything just yet. I think this means that American policy is willing to consider regime destabilization as a potential outcome. And if we consider the recent history of state failures in the region, whether in Iraq, Syria, Yemen or Libya, this should really be of great concern, because state failure in these places has posed a real challenge to American interests in recent years.

SIMON: Well, help us add that up. What could regional instability mean? What would be the practical effects?

HANNA: Well, if you have catastrophic success in destabilizing the Iranian regime, it’s very unlikely that you’ll completely dislodge the leadership. There are supporters. There are military forces. There are the IRGC forces which have for decades been the most powerful military actors in Iran, a very large country.

And what you might have if you see increased destabilization is a civil war, something like a civil war. And it is very unlikely that it will remain confined to Iranian borders. As we have seen with Iraq and Syria, conflicts of this type in the Middle East will not be contained. So while the Israelis, I think, seem pretty comfortable with the idea of ​​destabilization and sort of an incoherent Iran, I have doubts about the ability of the United States to live with what that would mean for the region and the kinds of spillover effects that that might have on the Gulf and how that might impact U.S. allies and partners in the region.

SIMON: Michael Wahid Hanna of the International Crisis Group. Thank you very much for being with us.

HANNA: Thanks for inviting me.

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