The Limits of Iran’s Proxy Empire
All of Iran’s proxies share a deep ideological hatred toward Israel and America. “The proxies’ logic for Iran was mainly this idea of forward defense, which meant that instead of fighting in Iran, let’s take our fights to other regions,” Mansour explained. But now that Iran is engaged in “a direct fight against the United States and Israel and their interests in the region,” he continued, these allied groups are “less necessary.”
Yet the Houthis could be particularly valuable to Iran in the current conflict, as the group has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to resist U.S. and Israeli strikes. This includes two US-led campaigns against Yemen – first under the Biden administration, in 2024, and then under the Trump administration, last year, which struck Houthi positions and weapons arsenals for months. Not only did the group remain intact, but its survival may have strengthened its image in Yemen and its hold on the country.
If the Houthis got involved now, they could open several new fronts in the war simultaneously. The group could fire drones and missiles at commercial ships in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, as it has done before, closing a vital shipping lane that connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. Significant quantities of crude oil, liquefied natural gas, manufactured goods, electronics and food products pass through this passage. Its closure, coupled with Iran’s chokehold of the Strait of Hormuz, could stifle global trade, drive up oil and energy prices even further and cause stock market crashes around the world, putting additional pressure on the Trump administration and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to end the war. Some carriers are already avoiding the Red Sea route, anticipating Houthi attacks. (Last spring, as the United States struck Yemen, the Houthis claimed to have launched missiles and drones at the U.S. aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman in the Red Sea.) The Houthis could also fire long-range missiles at Israel and target Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf countries — including their oil, energy and economic infrastructure — from the south, while Iran strikes those countries from the north, in a joint pincer movement.
It is possible that the Houthis will rejoin the conflict later, if there is a protracted war and the Gulf countries, which have so far focused on protecting themselves against Iranian strikes, go on the offensive. (On Saturday, Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s president, apologized to the Gulf states for his strikes, but the attacks persisted.) Mohammed al-Basha, an expert on Middle East politics and security, told me the Houthis were preparing for action. In recent weeks, he and other analysts have learned that the Houthis have deployed missile launchers, drone task forces and military brigades throughout northern Yemen, from the Red Sea coast to the border with Saudi Arabia. The group would also dig tunnels, build bunkers and erect barriers and other defensive structures in the event of an attack from the United States and Israel. Ahmed Nagi, senior Yemen analyst for the International Crisis Group, told me that Iran and its proxies believe in “gradual escalation,” knowing that it may not be “wise to use all of its wild cards at once.” The Houthis are Iran’s biggest wild card. So the fact that the group has not yet gone to war can only be seen as “a calculated choice,” which was “fully coordinated with the Iranians,” Nagi said. “They believe that Iran, for now, can manage the situation and face all these challenges alone. ” But if the conflict widens even further, he added, “the Houthis will intervene. They need some time to assess the situation before joining the fight.”
