What Have the U.S. and Israel Accomplished in Iran?
On Monday evening, forty-eight hours after President Donald Trump ordered a series of strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, he announced a cease-fire between Israel and Iran. Earlier in the day, Iran had pulled missiles on an American air base in Qatar, an attack that came with a prior warning and made no victim. The Trump administration had initially pointed out a reluctance to be formally involved in the Israel campaign to destroy the Iranian nuclear program, but, since Saturday strikes Trump had publicly thought about the possibility of a change of diet. Even after his announcement on Monday that he had helped take a break in hostilities, Iran and Israel continued to exchange missile attacks, each party accusing the other of breaking the terms of the ceasefire. Tuesday morning, Trump told journalists in the White House: “We have essentially two countries that have fought for so long and so hard that they don’t know what they are doing.”
Nicole Grajewski is a member of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace program, and the author of the book “Russia and Iran”. (On Monday, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met the most powerful ally in his country in Moscow, Vladimir Putin, who criticized the American strike.) Grajewski and I spoke just before the announcement of the ceasefire and followed after Trump’s statement. Our conversation, edited for length and clarity, is below. In this document, we discuss the reason why a cease-fire can be difficult to maintain, what relations of Russia with Iran and Israel can predict for the region, and why a war intended to end the nuclear program of Iran can rather have prolonged uncertainty.
What are your concerns about a short, medium and long-term ceasefire?
In the short term, I think my main concern is accidental climbing. Whether Iraq Iraq proxy groups launching something against Israel and Israel, or due to an answer to the statements of Israel or Iran. In the long term, my concern concerns the acrimonious relationship between Iran and Israel which would probably continue. This ceasefire will not eradicate years of war from the shadows in which Iran and Israel are locked up. And the nuclear problem continues to loom.
How so?
On Monday, the National Safety and Foreign Policy Committee of the Iranian Parliament approved an overview of a bill that suspend Iranian cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. This would reduce efforts to identify, or at least take into account the stock of highly enriched uranium and access to these nuclear sites. There can therefore be momentum in Iran which seems to push against international surveillance on its nuclear program.
Netanyahu has also been very aggressive lately-could you see him give Trump a victory on a short-term ceasefire, as he did with Gaza, then wanting to restart the war?
It is very predictable that Israel takes advantage of it again to go and eliminate certain facilities or leadership. I think that a large part of the climbing dynamics probably depends on what remains of the Iranian nuclear program and how close they are to be reconstituted. Some of the metal uranium installations have been destroyed, so it is in fact a fairly good stop for some of the arms work. But we do not know where is highly enriched uranium that Iran had. And then Iran has a lot of centrifugal components, and these have not been inspired by the IAEA since 2021. So, on the long term side, you could see Iran develop a secret program. In addition, because you have seen Israel assassinate Iranian scientists in the past, Iran has created a fairly robust community of nuclear scientists, nuclear engineers, nuclear physicists, so that the continuity of knowledge would be maintained. It is therefore not as if knowledge was eradicated. And I think that a thing that will happen following the penetration of mass intelligence which has really reduced the military response of Iran and led to this destruction of their leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard (IRGC), is that there will be a higher state of survival, a higher assignment at the societal level, and I think, a much more secret program.
What internal and external dynamics are you seeing in Iran at the moment?
There is a domestic audience to whom Iranian management wants to transmit a semblance of stability and a semblance of force. But it is also a question of reporting in the United States that Iran is not weak and that, despite these massive tubes with regard to their military facilities, with regard to their conventional power, they still reserve the right to respond. But it seems that there was a warning or signaling to America and / or Qatar before this military attack in Qatar. Iran probably does not want to get involved in an attrition war with the United States, even if it is preparing for one.
The signaling is therefore simply to specify that a prolonged war is not what Iran wants?
Yes, and there is obviously now this concern concerning the change of diet and internal stability. And so it will be something, I think, that Iranian strategists also think, because the continuation of this war also increases their vulnerability with regard to the type of control they have at home. Israel targeted some of the repression bodies in Iran on Monday, such as the so-called Basij, for example, and other parts of their internal security services.
Can you talk a bit about how the diet is structured and works?
The regime works on repression and terror to some extent. This is how he was trained in this revolutionary context, then after the Iran-Iraq war. But it is strongly bureaucratized and also institutionalized. And the body of the Islamic revolutionary guard is an aspect. And part of this is the Basij, which is their internal clip on power. But they also have major conglomerates of economic interests which are really based on corruption. And it is facaction. There are certain factions where you have the clergy and this accent in certain parts of the country. So, in Qom, for example, it is a fairly great concentration of power with regard to the clergy. And you therefore see this in the discussions on the Guardian council, which oversees the elections and approves the legislation, or even with discussions on the succession. But there are also these ducts which are very anchored in this ideology of confrontation with the United States and Israel. And this also includes a very strong accent on the maintenance at least of this type of threshold nuclear status and the projection also of its power throughout the region.
Iran therefore works like a kleptocracy, but also very ideological. And, of course, all this is motivated by a sharp feeling of vulnerability to any type of internal or external upheaval that could threaten the very existence of the regime. And, of course, there is a supreme leader, and he is the ultimate referee in Iran, but there is an elite group around him.
I saw you warn of the consequences of the regime change. What about the structure of this diet that you have just defined widely, do you make sure you are specifically concerned?
In the United States, a problem with the discussion on the change of the Iranian regime is that it is an objective in itself, but there is nothing with what is happening afterwards. Iraq’s experience is a good example. But with Iran, I think what is worrying is that there are such strong and militarized factions that could potentially ride a little counter-group. The Iranian people do not mainly support the current regime, and many Iranians do not support a revolutionary theocracy. But there are also people who are really in charge of this massive repression apparatus. And so one of my concerns is also that we are pursuing a policy of regime change, and what is really going on at the national level in Iran is a much greater repression and much more insecurity insofar as civilians are those who suffer the most. The change of regime finally belongs to the Iranian people. One could hope that this regime would fall at one point and that a democratic government will increase. But, you know, this is not always how international relations take place.
