Each side spins a different story about the US-Iran peace talks – but Tehran may have the last word | Rajan Menon

For those following the crisis between the United States and Iran, the last few days have been confusing. On Friday, the ceasefire in force for six weeks seemed doomed to failure. Donald Trump skipped his son’s wedding to stay in the White House and reportedly considered further military strikes against Iran. On Saturday, apprehension gave way to optimism. Trump announced that a deal with Iran would be reached “shortly.” On Sunday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio added to that hope by saying there would be “good news” soon.

Iranian leaders quickly dampened this optimism. The country’s media described Trump’s social media post as propaganda, and Iranian officials highlighted several remaining controversial points. As Tehran began to reveal – in very general terms – its vision for a deal, the divide between it and Washington became even more evident.

The Trump administration wants the Strait of Hormuz to reopen immediately. He also insists on the withdrawal of all Iranian stocks of enriched uranium and on the ban on enrichment. The Iranians, however, want to proceed in two phases. In the first phase, the ceasefire, which would include Lebanon, would be extended for 60 days. The strait would be opened without ships being required to pay tolls, and the United States would lift its naval blockade and begin unfreezing Iranian assets and lifting economic sanctions.

Even this first phase could fail. Israel, alarmed by this agreement, wants to preserve its freedom of action in Lebanon. And it’s hard to imagine how Washington’s insistence on a free and open strait can be reconciled with Iran’s May 18 announcement of a Persian Gulf Strait Authority that will oversee maritime traffic and levy tolls on shipping.

The United States and Israel have also insisted that Iran must reduce the number and range of its ballistic missiles and stop supporting its regional partners Hezbollah, Hamas and Ansar Allah (usually called the Houthis) in Yemen. Iran has not mentioned any of these points, but Israel and its American supporters will surely object if Trump gives ground.

Assuming the strait reopens, Iranian ports are unblocked, and the United States begins to ease sanctions and release frozen assets, Washington and Tehran will move to the next phase, which will focus on Iran’s nuclear program. Yet Tehran has not made clear what it is prepared to do and what it will not do – no small feat given that Trump has said more than 70 times that Iran cannot be allowed to possess nuclear weapons.

The United States has demanded that Iran’s entire stockpile of enriched uranium – not just the roughly 450kg of 60% enriched uranium – be transported out of the country, which its supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, has apparently rejected. Reducing uranium mixing under the guidance of international observers is one way around this problem, but it may not be acceptable to Trump, who is already under fire from hawks for making concessions to Tehran. If the United States and Iran cannot reach an agreement on the nuclear issue, they could find themselves back at square one. This would endanger the ceasefire.

Optimists may interpret the Iranian position as an offer of opening, part of which will be sacrificed in exchange for American concessions. Tehran wants war reparations but must know that Trump will never agree to pay them. It could drop this demand in exchange for, for example, faster sanctions relief. Optimists recognize that Trump is under pressure – the price of oil and other commodities has soared because of the war, which a majority of Americans oppose – but, in their view, Iran also needs a deal; the U.S. blockade raised the price of food and medicine and forced businesses to close.

But pessimists say the ceasefire could fail if Trump concludes in phase two that he must return to war to gain more leverage, or if Israel attacks Hezbollah – or even Iran. They will also note that the announcement of details of the deal – which Trump had said would soon be achieved – was delayed due to ongoing disagreements.

Even if all these obstacles are overcome and a final agreement emerges, conditions will favor Iran more than the United States. Certainly, Trump could resume his military strikes to obtain more concessions from Iran, but there is no guarantee that the use of force will be more effective than it was between February 28 and April 8. Additionally, a resumption of war would further harm the U.S. and global economy, something Trump wants to avoid as the midterm elections approach.

Assuming Trump does not renege on the deal under growing pressure from his opponents, he will have the chance to secure terms similar to those in the Obama administration’s 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. That won’t be much of an achievement considering he spent $29 billion as of mid-May on a failed war that has shaken the global economy.

• Rajan Menon is professor emeritus of international relations at the City College of New York and a senior fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. His co-author, Daniel R DePetris, is a member of Defense Priorities and a syndicated foreign affairs columnist at the Chicago Tribune.