China-Japan diplomatic feud over Taiwan issue escalates : NPR

New Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi speaks during a news conference at the Prime Minister’s Office in Tokyo on October 21.

Eugène Hoshiko/Pool AP

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Eugène Hoshiko/Pool AP

SEOUL – The biggest feud between Japan and China in more than a decade appears to be escalating, with China attempting to isolate Japan diplomatically as punishment for Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks last month about Japan’s possible involvement in a conflict over Taiwan.

No end is in sight and neither side is showing signs of going downhill.

In recent weeks, China has tried to persuade the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to support its position. It asserts that “Taiwan’s return to China is an integral part of the post-war international order,” as Chinese leader Xi Jinping told President Trump in a November 24 phone call. Trump, meanwhile, made no mention of the Taiwan issue in a social media post about the call.

The diplomatic effort is only part of a coordinated campaign employing political, economic and cultural tools. China sent two letters of protest to the United Nations. He halted imports of seafood from Japan, advised Chinese citizens not to travel there and canceled film screenings and concerts.

Experts say the context of Takaichi’s remarks is key to understanding the dispute between Japan and China.

The Japanese constitution prohibits him from waging war. But 2015 security legislation allows it to use its military in self-defense, in response to an armed attack on Japan, or an attack on an ally (the country has only one formal ally, the United States) that poses an existential threat to Japan. The United States and Japan signed a mutual defense treaty in 1960.

CLARITY OF LEGISLATIVE CONTROL VS. Strategic ambiguity

Japan’s prime minister and Cabinet have wide discretion in deciding what constitutes an existential threat, but they need parliamentary approval.

At a parliamentary budget committee hearing on November 7, opposition lawmaker Katsuya Okada asked Takaichi under what circumstances a Chinese naval blockade of Taiwan could threaten Japan’s survival. Takaichi responded that a blockade involving Chinese warships could pose such a threat.

“Your response does not narrowly define an existential threat,” Okada retorted. “This gives the government very broad discretion. That’s why I’m worried.”

The United States, China and Japan are ambiguous about how they might act in a possible conflict over Taiwan. But in this case, lawmakers sought clarity and tried to corner Takaichi, to avoid dragging Japan into unnecessary conflict.

“I think that deep in her heart, she [Takaichi] I should have realized she had made a mistake. And that’s a very costly, very costly mistake,” says Zhou Bo, a senior researcher at the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University in Beijing and a former senior colonel in the People’s Liberation Army.

Takaichi has since promised not to discuss any hypothetical scenarios regarding Taiwan. But she defended herself in Parliament last week, saying that while she could have played it safe, she wanted to come clean.

“If I had simply repeated the government’s previous position over and over again, the budget committee session could have been suspended,” she said, but “I was asked to provide specific examples and I tried to respond faithfully.”

TAKAICHI WAS NOT ALONE

Takaichi is not the only leader to deviate from the script and appear to contradict a policy of strategic ambiguity.

President Joe Biden has done it no less than four times. Each time, the White House walked back its comments, insisting there was no policy change.

So why did China launch a pressure campaign against Japan, but not against the United States?

Akio Takahara, a political scientist at the University of Tokyo and an expert on China, offers a possible explanation.

“Why? Because they think America is stronger and they don’t want to upset the United States.”

But if the United States is ambiguous about its commitment to defending Taiwan, could Japan defend Taiwan alone?

That’s the troubling implication of Takaichi’s remarks, says Zhou Bo of Tsinghua University.

“Given the disparity in military strength between China and Japan, it is simply impossible for Japan to do this. So this time we find ourselves in an interesting situation, where the tail is wagging the dog.”

CYCLES IN JAPAN-CHINA LINKS

Another important piece of context, Akio Takahara says, is that Japan and China have had many ups and downs in their relationship and, he believes, ties will eventually bounce back.

He adds that in some ways, China’s response to Japan’s perceived infractions is gentler than before.

“This time, they are not allowing any protests,” he notes, “and they are not allowing any boycotts of Japanese products.”

This was not the case in 2012. Japan purchased the controversial Diaoyu Islands, as China calls them, or the Senkakus in Japanese, from a private owner.

Protesters took to the streets in more than 100 cities across China. Today, the Chinese government is less tolerant of protests, especially those that can quickly turn against it.

Trump said his relationship with Takaichi was good, but he did not mention the dispute with China or express support for Takaichi.

The Japanese government has denied reports that Trump told Takahashi not to escalate the feud with Japan.

JAPAN’S FEARS OF BETRAYAL

But some Japanese fear Trump could strike a deal with China that would betray Taiwan and Japan.

“If it’s an agreement that sells Taiwan, it won’t be good for Japan,” South Korea or the United States, Takahara believes. “We don’t know what Trump is going to say tomorrow,” he adds. “So we are worried. But what can we do?”

For now, Beijing continues to insist that Prime Minister Takaichi retract his comments. She refused to do so, but said she was open to negotiations with Beijing. But Zhou Bo believes that the Taiwan issue is too important for China to compromise.

“It includes so many things, honor, dignity,” and a “century of humiliation,” during which the imperial powers of the 19th century carved up China into spheres of influence.

“There is no question of China backing down,” says Zhou, “so the ball is in the Japanese court.”

In the past, experts note, China let its differences with governments like South Korea, Australia and the Philippines fester until a new administration came along and made appeasement gestures.

But Takaichi only took office last month and, depending on his political fortunes, waiting for him could take a long time.