What Israel and Hamas Actually Want from the Gaza Ceasefire

Earlier this month, Israel and Hamas announced a ceasefire in the two-year war in Gaza. The deal was negotiated in part by the United States, but U.S. officials are concerned, according to the New York Times. Timesthat Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could try to put an end to it. Indeed, since the start of the ceasefire, nearly a hundred Palestinians and two Israeli soldiers have been killed. (Under the first stage of the deal, Israel retains control of approximately fifty-three percent of Gaza.)

I recently spoke on the phone with Michael Milshtein, director of the Palestinian Studies Forum at Tel Aviv University. Milshtein served as senior advisor to the commander of COGATwho oversees civilian policy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and who heads the Palestinian Affairs Department within the IDF’s military intelligence branch. During our conversation, which was edited for length and clarity, we discussed what Netanyahu wants for Gaza, Hamas’ strategic goal of taking control of the Palestinian national movement, and why a lasting ceasefire in Gaza will be so difficult.

If this ceasefire is to work, what will it look like in the coming months? What is the best case scenario?

Most, if not all, scenarios will be bad, so we’re not talking about the best case scenario, but the least worst case scenario. And it would be the beginning of a new regime, the establishment of a new Palestinian regime in Gaza, which does not include Hamas. There would be a symbolic deployment of international forces and some sort of coordination system between Israel, the United States and other international forces regarding any violations of the ceasefire. And then Israel would be able to act immediately against any challenge or threat that develops in Gaza, and be warned of a plan to launch rockets or smuggle weapons or things like that. That would be the best case scenario.

At the same time, I must say quite frankly, this best-case scenario would also mean that Israel would not control most of the territory of Gaza, with the possible exception of several areas near the border. This is the only part that would be retained by Israel. And, in this scenario, Hamas would commit to holding only defensive weapons, such as rifles, grenades and pistols. They would not be able to have offensive weapons, particularly rockets.

So there would be a sort of disarmament of Hamas, and Israel would not launch strikes, and an international force would help secure Gaza, as provided for in the ceasefire agreement. I assume that when you said you wanted to be “very frank”, you meant that a solution like this could also prevent Israeli expansionist fantasies in Gaza, correct?

Yes. There are still many people here in Israel who say that our goal is not only to defeat Hamas but also to remove the Palestinians from Gaza or perhaps even expel them. And this fantasy will not come true. And even more, I believe that it is not possible to convince Hamas to completely give up its weapons. But I think that if Hamas doesn’t have the same power as two years ago, and it won’t be able to engage again on October 7, and it will still be limited by Israel and by international forces, I think it’s not a bad situation for Israel.

You say there is no good solution here, but you have laid out what you think is the best or least bad solution.

That’s correct.

But does either party want it? How do you understand at this point what Hamas and the Netanyahu government want? Let’s start with Netanyahu.

I think he doesn’t want the current ceasefire. He was forced to accept it because it was imposed on him. And of course, there is a very wide gap between his demands for a ceasefire and what actually happened. For example, he demanded that Hamas make a very clear commitment to complete disarmament. And of course, we don’t see it at the moment. I am sure that Netanyahu’s government will not be satisfied with the scenario I described above. I think that perhaps another government in Israel, when there are elections, will be more satisfied with such a scenario. And I think that other actors, like Turkey and Qatar, will be very satisfied with such a scenario, because they will be able to preserve Hamas as an actor in Gaza. But at the same time, they can tell that there is some kind of change, even if it’s a cosmetic change.

And as for the United States, I’m sure there will be no way to implement all the goals it has set, such as achieving the total disarmament of Hamas or convincing Hamas to accept all the international forces that Vice President JD Vance talked about during his recent trip to Israel. He spoke of Indonesian and Gulf forces potentially deploying to Gaza. But I think Hamas has some reservations about the presence of a large international force.

Netanyahu has long resisted a ceasefire. You said that the ceasefire was imposed on him. But what does he want? When we spoke several months ago, you thought Netanyahu was flirting with the expansionist views on Gaza resettlement expressed by his right-wing ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir. What do you think he really wants now?

What he really wants is to be able to announce the defeat of Hamas, even if it means occupying most, if not all, of Gaza, and even staying there. Smotrich and Ben-Gvir are of course keen to occupy Gaza and even encourage Palestinians to emigrate from Gaza. Regarding Netanyahu, I think he understands that he can’t really convince many people in Israel today that he defeated Hamas. And I think he’s very bothered by the fact that Hamas still exists, that Hamas is still the dominant player in Gaza. If he could choose, he would prefer to continue the war. It seems that it was President Trump who decided to end the war.

What I find strange from Netanyahu’s point of view is this: you say he doesn’t want Hamas to remain in control of Gaza.

That’s correct.

But I understand that he also does not want the Palestinian Authority [P.A.] in Gaza, and he certainly does not want conditions in Gaza to make the creation of a Palestinian state more likely.