Contributor: Tehran has only bad options. Trump and Netanyahu have golden opportunities
After the American attack on the main Iranian nuclear installations in Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan, Tehran only faces bad options. Militarily, Iran can degenerate the conflict by attacking American forces and the allies in the region, as it did on Monday with missile attacks against the American bases in Qatar and Iraq. Iran could also close the Hormuz Strait, withdraw from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty or even try a rapid “breakdown” to a bomb with its residual capacities. Each of these options practically ensures an American military response which goes far beyond the nuclear program of Iran, perhaps leading to a targeted campaign to overthrow the regime, the largest nightmare of the Islamic Republic.
A more likely military response would therefore be for Iran to react by continuing to attack Israel – as it is made only a few hours after the United States strike – in order to transform the conflict into an attrition war that Israel can afford. Israel could degenerate to try to end war faster and avoid extending the losses.
Diplomatically, Iran can resume negotiations, but President Trump’s request for “unconditional surrender”, the conditions of which he had not stated. In reality, they would likely include the complete dismantling of Iranian nuclear and missile programs and important borders to its regional role, as well as long-term inspections and more. If Tehran takes over these requests, this would considerably increase the risk of new American military action, including the regime itself – targeting military and civilian leaders and infrastructure, not just nuclear sites.
Alternatively, it can mainly access Trump’s requests, in which case it avoids direct American intervention and war ends, but Iran loses its ultimate security guarantor – nuclear capacity – and practically its whole leverage to request concessions in other international talks. The diet also seems so low that the probability of a domestic uprising would increase exponentially.
Whatever the option that Iran chooses by Iran, the very future of the Islamic Republic has never been more danger. Consequently, the prospects of a spectacular positive transformation of the strategic landscape of the Middle East have never been larger.
The American American effort that lasted decades to establish a regional coalition of the Arab states and Israel, to contain Iran, will receive a significant boost, because the first wins confidence to face a very weak Iran and by residing in the United States in the region. The dangers of proliferation, at least in the Middle East, could be considerably reduced. Israel will have demonstrated – although with critical American assistance – that the “beginning doctrine” (Israeli determination to take all the means necessary to prevent a hostile regional state from developing nuclear weapons) always applies. Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the three most likely proliferators in the region after Iran, will have few reasons to pursue nuclear weapons.
The inability of Russia and China to offer their Iranian ally any practical support during the war contrasts strongly with the United States and Israel and is particularly exasperating for Iran because of its strong support for the Kremlin during the Russian War in Ukraine. Moscow and Beijing will undergo a significant reduction in their regional status, accumulating for the benefit of Washington. The Middle East will again be considered a region clearly dominated by the Americans, in which Russia and China will have to walk more carefully.
There are some in the United States which fear conflicts of the Middle East distracting the American attention of competition with China-the only nation which approaches the economic influence of the United States today-and Russia. But playing a direct role in this Iran-Israeli conflict not has diverted the American focus of Moscow and Beijing. On the contrary, it has considerably strengthened the world stature of Washington compared to the two countries. China will hesitate more to attack Taiwan now that the United States has demonstrated the desire to bomb the attackers against the American allies.
An Israel whose enemies have been considerably weakened and which are no longer faced with an existential threat from Iran, would be much better to progress on the Palestinian issue, starting at the end of the war in Gaza. Indeed, it would not be eccentric to assume that Trump, still transactional, may have made a prerequisite for his support for Israel during the war. Saudi normalization will be back on the table.
Netanyahu is preparing this moment for 30 years, for the opportunity to end the existential threat only to which Israel continues to face. Of the folded leader whose administration authorized the fiasco of October 7 And various outrages in domestic affairs, he now remembers one of the great heroes of Israel. In addition, a favorable result in war could very well save him from what seems to have been an imminent electoral defeat – which could have been followed by prison sentence, taking into account the accusations of corruption he faces.
The biggest question is whether Netanyahu – whose in -depth understanding of the global strategic circumstances of Israel has never doubted – does not wish to use this opportunity to crown its heritage not only with the safeguard of Israel from an existential military threat, but also of an almost also severe demographic challenge in its own future as a Jewish and democratic state. Fordo can be gone; The Palestinians remain. He would really cement his position in history if he ended the Gaza war and paved the way for a resolution of the Palestinian question.
Netanyahu and Trump both deserve the merit of having taken daring measures, and they must be ready to continue to do so. Now is not the time to be shy but to continue to press the advantage. They have engaged in a classic case of coercive diplomacy, the use of military force for diplomatic purposes, and must see it until the desired end: a diplomatic agreement with Iran which guarantees, with an unprecedented intrusion inspection regime, that it can never develop its nuclear capacities for military purposes again, puts severe limits to its missile capacities and does not reduce its malicious regional role.
Even with a provisional ceasefire in place, making an agreement of this type will not be easy. It is unlikely that Iranians fully accelerate American requests unless they really feel that they have their backs to the wall, and even then, they are unusually effective negotiators. Perseverance, concentration and attention to detail, not known to be strong from Trump, will now be requested. A historical opening has been made; It should not be wasted.
Chuck Freilich, former deputy advisor to Israeli national security, is a principal researcher at the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies. Colin P. Clarke is research director at Soufan Group, a security and information -based consultancy company based in New York.
