Greenland’s role in US missile defense shows why the Arctic still matters

President Donald Trump’s announcement that the United States would impose 10 percent tariffs on imports from eight European countries opposed to U.S. control of Greenland has forced a long-ignored debate on the Arctic. Several European governments responded with immediate objections, while skepticism at the national level followed just as quickly.

Critics warn that the tariffs risk alienating allies and straining NATO. Polls reveal widespread public unease with any measure that resembles US domination of Greenland. These concerns are real, but they do not change the strategic facts. Dismissing Greenland as optional ignores a central lesson of modern history: the Arctic has never been peripheral to the defense of the American homeland.

Washington faced a similar – and far more dangerous – strategic dilemma during the Cold War.

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During this period, American defense planners did not view the Arctic as a distant theater. They see it as the most direct route of attack against North America. Soviet bombers and missiles followed the shortest routes above the Pole, forcing Washington to confront an unavoidable geographical reality.

Because missiles and bombers took polar trajectories, the geography of the Arctic determined U.S. defense planning. In cooperation with Canada and with Denmark’s agreement to Greenland, the United States built an unprecedented early warning system in the High North. The Pinetree Line, the Mid-Canada Line, and the Remote Early Warning (DEW) Line together formed more than sixty radar stations stretching from Alaska across the Canadian Arctic to Greenland. When intercontinental ballistic missiles replaced bombers as the primary threat, Washington adapted again, establishing the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System at Thule in Greenland, Clear in Alaska and Fylingdales in the United Kingdom – designed to provide decision-makers with critical warning time in the event of a nuclear crisis.

These lessons from the Cold War still apply, as missile flight paths, warning times, and homeland defense remain shaped by Arctic geography.

Some analysts argue that existing defenses – particularly those at Fort Greely, Alaska – reduce the need for strategic positioning in Greenland. Fort Greely is a critical part of America’s missile defense. But it doesn’t work in isolation.

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In a crisis measured in minutes, even small gaps in detection or tracking can mean the difference between deterrence and catastrophe.

Missile defense depends on multiple sensors and early warning systems positioned over vast distances. Advanced radar installations in the Arctic extend detection time and improve tracking of threats from polar trajectories. During the Cold War, Washington did not choose between Alaska and Greenland; it strengthened both. Defense planners still rely on geographic depth to preserve warning time and decision space.

Greenland’s importance, however, goes well beyond missile defense and early warning.

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In addition to their military importance, Greenland’s deposits of rare earths and other critical minerals have become a focal point of competition between the United States, Europe and China. These materials are the foundation of modern weapons systems, energy technologies and advanced manufacturing. Unfortunately, the United States remains uncomfortably dependent on Chinese-dominated supply chains.

The strategic objective regarding Greenland should not be ownership per se. It is about access and denial: ensuring reliable access to the West while preventing Beijing from securing long-term leverage over future supplies. This objective can be pursued through long-term investment agreements, joint development and security partnerships with Greenland and Denmark – without annexation.

But access without security is fragile. China has repeatedly used its trade positions to turn its economic presence into political leverage. Agreements only endure if they are backed by credible deterrence.

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For years, Arctic shipping routes were considered speculative. Those days are over. The Northwest Passage is becoming increasingly navigable, shortening transit between Asia, Europe and North America. Russia already considers Arctic waters as sovereign corridors, imposed by military power. China is positioning itself for future control of ports, resupply nodes and underwater infrastructure. Greenland occupies a central position along these developing Arctic routes.

An expanded NATO presence in the Arctic – including Greenland – would strengthen deterrence, particularly if it includes significant US forces. But NATO remains an alliance of consensus, and consensus slows down decision-making in times of crisis.

During the Cold War, the defense of Greenland worked because American leadership was clear and operational authority was unambiguous, even though Danish sovereignty was fully respected. Effective deterrence requires clear authority and accountability, not uncertainty about who decides when time is of the essence.

The way this debate is structured has real consequences. Talk of “taking” Greenland or defeating local opposition invites comparisons to imperial endeavors that the United States should never repeat. America does not need occupying forces or another protracted insurrection. History – from the Philippines after 1898 – offers direct warnings of the costs of confusing strategic geography with colonial ambition.

Greenland and Denmark have made it clear that Greenland is not for sale. Tariffs can draw attention to this problem, but coercion should not replace diplomacy, investment, and alliance leadership.

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Polls show that many Americans oppose acquiring or dominating Greenland. This skepticism reflects war weariness and distrust of open-ended commitments. But this reflects an inability to explain the issues – not the absence of them. Greenland is not Iraq or Afghanistan. There would be no nation-building project, no counter-insurgency campaign and no attempt to impose governance.

This debate is about access, settlement rights, early warning capacity, and denial authority – goals that the United States has already pursued in Greenland, successfully and peacefully.

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Washington faces a choice that is often mischaracterized as empire versus restraint. In reality, the decision is whether to remain engaged, respecting sovereignty and alliances, or withdraw as strategic competitors consolidate their influence. As China and Russia expand their influence in the Far North, American leadership – rooted in history, geography and restraint – remains indispensable.

America once learned that the Arctic is the gateway to its homeland. Forgetting this lesson now would lead to far more dangerous consequences than remembering it.

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