Hungary’s Voters May Take a Step Toward Unwinding Orbán’s Autocracy
This article is part of the TPM Café, the TPM opinion and news analysis site.
On Sunday, April 12, Hungarians will go to the polls in elections that will decide the future of their country and the illiberal state that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán – Europe’s longest-serving head of state and a role model for far-right authoritarians in Europe and America – has built over the past 16 years in power.
After securing a two-thirds majority in 2010, the Orbán government systematically dismantled democratic institutions and reshaped the electoral system to make future victories for the prime minister’s party, Fidesz, more likely. He rewrote the constitution with little input from society, experts or opposition parties; public institutions, including the Constitutional Court, are filled with loyalists; media freedom severely restricted; challenged academic freedom; and undermined minority rights, particularly LGBTQ+ rights. Additionally, the Orbán government has placed Fidesz loyalists in high positions in public and state-owned enterprises, leading some observers to describe it as a “mafia state.” Orbán’s political allies, including would-be authoritarians in the United States who view his governance as a model, have paid close attention. President Donald Trump’s rapid moves during his second term to attack the administrative state, civil society and the media, including pushing allies to control news organizations perceived as hostile, have led to frequent comparisons to Orbán’s playbook.
Due to Orbán’s state capture and the erosion of democratic institutions, the VDEM, a prominent democracy watchdog, has classified Hungary as an electoral autocracy since its 2020 report, while the European Union ruled in 2022 that Hungary could no longer be considered a democracy. Although elections still take place and can be considered “free,” they are no longer fair. A recent investigative documentary by independent filmmakers and journalists, “The Price of the Vote,” further documents serious allegations of vote buying, voter intimidation and election fraud, raising questions about election integrity ahead of the April 12 vote.
And yet, in this context, Orbán seriously risks losing his fifth consecutive re-election. Péter Magyar – who emerged on the political scene in early 2024 after a pardon scandal that rocked Orbán’s government and led to the resignation of President Katalin Novak and his ex-wife, Justice Minister Judith Varga – has become a pioneer in Hungarian politics. A former Fidesz member himself, Magyar has credibly attested to the corruption and cronyism of the Fidesz government, earning him a huge following. Unlike Fidesz’s election campaign, which focuses primarily on alleged external threats, Magyar campaigned largely on core issues that concern Hungarians on a daily basis, highlighting the dire state of the country’s health and education systems and low living standards. Promising to bring change and prosperity to Hungary, he now carries the hope of many voters.
Despite recent polls indicating a significant lead for Péter Magyar’s Tisza party, this is not an “ordinary” election. It takes place in the context of an electoral autocracy, and its outcome and consequences, including the prospects of desorbánization, remain uncertain.
First, given the disproportionality of the electoral system that Fidesz has built over the years, votes do not translate proportionally into parliamentary seats. In fact, Fidesz can still win the vast majority of parliamentary seats with less than 50% of the vote. It is therefore not clear how power will be distributed within the new parliament. Yet the distribution of power within the new parliament is crucial to whether the country can effectively desorb.
Many of Fidesz’s structural advantages are guaranteed by cardinal laws, which require a two-thirds majority to modify or abolish them. Furthermore, Fidesz is deeply rooted in the state, having placed party loyalists in high positions within key public institutions. A possible Tisza government will therefore first have to replace those Fidesz loyalists who were appointed to serve beyond one legislature and could hamper the work of a new government. This includes, for example, the budget council, made up of Fidesz loyalists, which can veto the new government’s draft budget, which could lead to early elections.
Furthermore, a new government must at least demonstrate credible efforts and implement reforms aimed at restoring the rule of law in order to restore around 18 billion euros in EU funds suspended due to serious violations of the rule of law under Fidesz. Without these resources, a new Tisza government will not be able to finance many of the proposed policies and improve living standards as promised in its election platform. Failure to deliver on these promises could then lead to voter discontent and frustration, potentially paving the way for Fidesz to return in the 2030 elections.
Given these political realities, if Tisza achieves only a simple majority, he would be in power but out of power: unable to implement promised and necessary reforms and facing parliamentary gridlock and Fidesz obstruction. Instead, the Magyar Tisza party needs a two-thirds majority in parliament to govern effectively and undo the system that Fidesz has built for 16 years, and which is designed to survive the party’s electoral defeat.
Yet even with such a constitutional majority, some obstacles will remain: Hungarian President Tamás Sulyok, a Fidesz member elected by Parliament by a two-thirds majority, will remain in office until 2029. Although this is primarily a ceremonial role, the president can hinder a future government’s governing process by delaying the legislative process, for example by returning legislation or referring it to constitutional courts, filled with loyalists of Fidesz, for consideration.
As a result, not only the future balance of power in Hungary, but also the prospects for desorbánization remain uncertain and will depend on the outcome of Sunday’s elections. Aware of what it stands to lose, Fidesz has already begun to sow doubts about the integrity of the elections and potential foreign interference – even though the Fidesz government itself poses the greatest threat in this regard. In the event of electoral defeat, Fidesz could double down on its “big lie”.
Ultimately, this election is not about whether Hungarians want change, as polls clearly suggest. Rather, the question is whether, in a system designed to defeat the opposition, its electoral success will translate into parliamentary power – and whether the opposition can then dismantle a system built to survive it.
