Inside the Telegram networks that outpace Israel’s sirens

As the missiles head toward Israel, Telegram groups and WhatsApp bots often beat official systems, circulating sensitive information in real time from municipal emergency services and local authorities.

The race against time during missile attacks has revealed how private Telegram and WhatsApp systems often override Home Front Command alerts, thanks to access to civilian command and control systems connected directly to radar data.

While the state conducts additional checks to avoid false alarms, private operators release raw information as soon as the Israeli Air Force identifies an early indication of a launch.

In an exclusive interview, Liron Bar, developer of the Tzeva Adom (Red Alert) application, explained the mechanism that allows bots to act faster than the official system, while warning of the dangers of partial or inaccurate information reaching the public through these channels.

When a Tzeva Adom siren sounds throughout Israel, most of the public follows the instructions of the Home Front Command and enters the protected spaces. However, a widespread phenomenon has developed in recent years: Telegram groups and messaging app bots report missile launches long before sirens are activated.

Many people wonder how an individual operating a Telegram channel can obtain information in front of an official military agency that operates some of the most advanced radar systems in the world.

The answer, according to Bar, lies in the information systems shared by military and civilian agencies, and the time lag created by the need to verify data before issuing a public alert. Bar said the secret lies in a system known as Shu’al Ezrahi (Civilian Fox), a command and control platform developed by the Home Front Command and now installed in the emergency operations rooms of many municipalities and major organizations across Israel.

The system is directly connected to Home Front Command data and displays precise polygons indicating where a missile is expected to land and at what exact time.

According to Bar, the operators of the most well-known Telegram channels effectively serve as conduits for information coming from those same emergency rooms. In some cases, they disclose the information themselves. In others, data is leaked to them from municipal command centers and emergency operations rooms that receive it in real time. As soon as someone sees an alert in the Civilian Fox system, it immediately forwards it to a bot or group, and within seconds the information reaches tens of thousands of people.

Reason for delay in military decision-making process

The reason these robots and private groups often beat the home front command lies in the military decision-making process. Once the radar detects a launch, it transmits an initial indication to the Israeli Air Force that a missile is heading toward Israel. This information is then transferred to Home Front Command, which must decide whether or not to activate the sirens.

Bar said the Home Front Command conducts a repeated and careful review before issuing each alert. There are cases, he noted, in which a launch initially appears to be headed toward Jerusalem, but further verification shows that the missile should fall in Jordan rather than Israel. It is for this reason that the official system does not send an alert based only on the first detection. The military prefers to wait a few more seconds to ensure that the threat really concerns the population, while private operators broadcast the information as soon as it appears on the emergency screen.

As the missile’s flight progresses, the indication becomes more precise. The computerized systems generate a sort of ellipse marking the estimated impact zone, and this zone shrinks as the missile continues its trajectory. Bar said that in the past, information was sometimes distributed up to eight minutes before impact, but modern systems are now more targeted. If the public is alerted two minutes before impact, the information is much more precise as to the final location.

Early information carries risks

While the early information may seem appealing, Bar stressed that it carries real risks. He said he always advises people not to rely on outside applications, even though “knowledge is power.” For some people, he says, early information can do more harm than good, creating unnecessary anxiety, especially when it isn’t accurate.

One of the main problems with these groups, he added, is a kind of telephone game effect. Bar said he knows of operators who transmit information late or in a distorted form. An operator may write that an impact is expected in three minutes when in reality there is only one minute left. For this reason, he said, the unequivocal recommendation is to obtain information only from the official Home Front Command app. The military system is the only one directly linked to physical warning sirens, and no private application has this same direct connection.

Another issue raised by the report is the system’s ability to identify missiles that separate. The Shu’al system includes detailed information on the nature of the threat, including cases in which a missile breaks into multiple warheads or large fragments. Group operators see this information and translate it into quick text alerts for the audience.
However, there are areas where the system is less effective, such as the open areas of the Arava region or along Route 6, where there are no clearly defined polygons as is the case inside cities.

Ultimately, rapidly changing Telegram information may satisfy curiosity and perhaps offer a sense of control, but in real time, only the official system offers the highest level of protection. According to the report, this system prevents casualties in more than 95% of cases when the public follows instructions.