News Analysis: Toppling Iraq’s Hussein unleashed chaos. Why Iran war poses similar risks

A campaign of shock and awe unleashing a tsunami of bombs. An enemy quickly succumbing to overwhelming firepower. And a triumphant American president trumpeting a quick and easy campaign.

In 2003, President George W. Bush walked confidently on the deck of an aircraft carrier less than five weeks after ordering the invasion of Iraq and declaring an “end of major combat operations” under a banner proclaiming “Mission Accomplished.”

This proved just the opposite.

The invasion became a meat grinder, killing thousands of Americans and perhaps more than a million Iraqis. It unleashed forces whose effects are still felt today in the region and beyond.

More than two decades later, another American president has attacked another Persian Gulf country, promising early success in a new Middle East adventure that he says will reshape the region.

President Trump and his team have vehemently rejected any comparison between “Operation Epic Fury,” launched Saturday, and “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” On Monday, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth gave a pugnacious press conference, insisting that “this is not Iraq.” It’s not endless. »

Yet the assault on Iran – almost four times the size of Iraq with more than twice its population – presents no shortage of challenges, which could spread chaos far beyond Iran’s borders and become a defining feature of Trump’s presidency.

In many ways, analysts say, toppling Iran’s leadership represents a far more complex task than Iraq ever faced. Iraq was a state marked by deep sectarian divisions and largely dominated by a single dictator: Saddam Hussein.

The Iran that emerged after the 1978-79 Islamic Revolution had a supreme leader, but Iran also developed an elaborate system of governance. This includes a president, a parliament and various government, military and religious hierarchies, noted Paul Salem, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute.

“Unlike Saddam’s Iraq, the Iranian state is multi-institutional and therefore much more resilient – ​​and, yes, not as vulnerable,” Salem said. “And hostility toward the United States and Israel is at the heart of the Islamic Revolution – rooted in the state. »

Here are some of the ways attacks on Iran could evolve into the very scenarios Trump once mocked as an anti-war candidate:

Boots on the ground

For now, the United States and Israel have used their air power to subdue Tehran. In the first minutes of the joint operation, a fleet of 200 aircraft – Israel’s largest – struck more than 500 targets in Iran, according to the Israeli military. One of these strikes killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Iran continues to retaliate, launching missiles at Israel, Persian Gulf countries, Jordan and other areas where U.S. bases are located. The United States has the qualitative and quantitative material advantage to ultimately prevail, but Iran’s capabilities will not make the task any easier, as military and aircraft losses over the past two days have demonstrated.

And wars have never been won by air power alone. Rather than relying on soldiers on the ground, Trump expects ordinary Iranians to finish the job for him.

“When we’re done, take power over your government. It will be yours to take,” he said in a video speech on the first day of the campaign.

During the Arab Spring of 2011, protesters across the Middle East took to the streets to demand change. But these efforts have mostly failed to result in meaningful reforms and, in some countries, have resulted in further crackdowns.

In Iran, it is true that many people would welcome the fall of the Islamic Republic – just as many Iraqis welcomed the fall of Hussein. But the mostly unarmed protesters are unlikely to prevail in a confrontation against law enforcement from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or its voluntary wing, the Basij.

It is also difficult to gauge how many of Iran’s 93 million people despise the government enough to rise up against it.

Meanwhile, Trump has left the door open to sending US troops, but the calculations for such a deployment raise doubts.

According to the US military, counter-insurgency doctrine requires 20 to 25 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants to achieve stability. In the case of Iran, this would involve the deployment of 1.9 million personnel, almost all of America’s active, reserve and National Guard military personnel.

New management unclear

At this point, it is unclear whether the decapitation of much of Iran’s ruling class will result in a real change of government, much less a successor inclined to bend to the wishes of the United States. The Islamic Republic’s upper echelons can boast a group made up mostly of hardliners – perhaps unsurprising for a nation that has been preparing for attack for years, if not decades.

Whatever new leadership emerges may rally around Khamenei’s “martyrdom.” Unpopular in his lifetime, it seems to have become, in death, a rallying cry of defiance. And martyrs are exalted in Shiite Islam, the dominant faith in Iran.

“He was the religious leader of the Shiites, so it’s a bit like killing the pope,” Salem said. “And it’s more popular to die a martyr than, say, a heart attack. … He went out in style, there’s no doubt about that.”

When the United States occupied Iraq, it was expected that what would follow would be a staunch ally of the United States, an idea perhaps best exemplified by the idea in Washington that a grateful Iraqi population would shower American troops with flowers. This did not happen. And in the Darwinian-style elimination of leaders that followed, those who emerged victorious had little love for the United States.

One of them was Nouri Al-Maliki, a Shiite supremacist whose policies were blamed for fueling years of sectarian bloodshed and whose loyalties often seemed more aligned with Tehran than with Washington.

Meanwhile, Tehran, playing on its proximity and deep ties to the new Iraqi ruling class, has managed to steer Iraq – a predominantly Shia country – deeper into its orbit.

After the Iraqi government – ​​with the help of a US-led coalition – ousted the Islamic State from Iraq in 2017, Iran was able to integrate allied militias into the Iraqi armed forces. This created the paradoxical situation of fighters aligned with Tehran and using equipment supplied by the United States.

Iraq has not yet emerged from Iran’s shadow. After the last Iraqi elections, Maliki appeared ready to become prime minister again, prompting Trump to write on Truth Social: “Because of his insane policies and ideologies, if elected, the United States of America will no longer help Iraq.” »

A fragmented opposition

The Iranian population is diverse; an estimated two-thirds of Iranians are Persian, while minorities include Kurds, Baloch, Arabs and Azeris.

These minorities have long-standing grievances against the ruling majority. It is possible that Trump’s campaign and the resulting unrest are fueling separatist tensions.

Last month, Iranian Kurdish factions came together in a coalition that they said would seek to overthrow the Islamic Republic “to realize the right of the Kurdish people to self-determination and establish a national and democratic entity based on the political will of the Kurdish nation in Iranian Kurdistan.”

An experienced insurrection

Over the decades, the Islamic Republic created a network that, at its peak, stretched from Pakistan to Lebanon.

This was a fearsome constellation of paramilitary factions and conciliatory governments, known as the Axis of Resistance. These included Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestinian lands, the Houthis in Yemen, and militias in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

After the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, Israel – and, ultimately, the United States – launched offensive campaigns to dismantle the groups.

Although weakened, the factions still survive and could form a powerful, transnational and motivated insurgency when the time comes to fight whatever might arise if the Islamic Republic falls.

Bulos reported from Khartoum, Sudan, and McDonnell from Mexico.