Opinion: How Sudan went from revolution to civil war

Publisher’s note: Justin Lynch is a researcher and analyst in Washington, DC. He is co-author of the book “The unfinished democracy of Sudan. “The views expressed here are his. no more opinions at CNN.

Cnn
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Four years ago, almost until the day, the inhabitants of Sudan celebrated a revolution after having reversed the longtime dictator Omar Al-Bashir. Now, the East African country faces the possibility of a complete collapse similar to the chaos that we see today in Yemen or Libya.

On Saturday, rival military factions began to fight in the capital of Khartoum. The two parties fought for the control of airports, bases and military compounds in the country. Violence quickly spread in the streets and across the country.

Some 45 million Sudanese are actually retained hostage and are unable to venture out of their house for fear of being killed in the cross -fires. At least 180 people perished in fighting, including three humanitarian workers from the World Food Program.

The conflict embodies two bitter rivals and their powerful armed forces against each other. On the one hand, the Sudanese armed forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. On the other hand, there are rapid support forces (RSF), a paramilitary group led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemeti.

There is no good side in this conflict. The two were accused of a long litany of human rights violations.

How did Sudan go from the creation of the despotic rule and the creation of an emerging democracy a few years ago to vacillate on the verge of the collapse of the state?

On April 11, 2019, the longtime dictator of Sudan, Bashir, was overthrown. The cause of the elimination of Bashir was months of demonstrations led by the unions of Sudan, which stimulated a military coup of the SAF and the RSF. Burhan and Hemeti both united their forces to remove their former boss.

It was a moment of promise because there was hope for democracy. I remember walking in the “sit -in” – a giant carnival of freedom in the midst of Khartoum that the demonstrators had blocked to demand the change. It was electric.

But social movements such as Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) – The Union behind the demonstration – often find it difficult to translate the momentum of their manifestations into real political power.

The reason is partly structural. Social movements such as the SPA are often based on basic activism. A dictator can stop one or two leaders of an organization but not an entire country.

However, once a dictator is overthrown, these types of social movements often find it difficult to build the hierarchy of leadership necessary during the political negotiations which take place. Like many other movements, the demonstrators of Sudan have not been able to translate mobilization into political power.

Civil leaders concluded negotiations with the military on the future of the country shortly after the fall of Bashir in April 2019. The two parties were not equal. Due to these leadership challenges, pro-democracies forces have struggled to negotiate the disciplined army.

Any momentum that the defenders of democracy had during the negotiations were swept away in June 2019 when the RSF soldiers violently dispersed the sit-in. More than 100 people were killed.

After the June massacre and the challenges of leadership, a transitional constitution was signed in August 2019 which gave the SAF and the RSF most of power in Sudan. Burhan was the head of state and Hemeti was placed in a high political position. Elections were promised in 2022, but few thought they would actually occur.

The transition period began in August 2019 and I interviewed Abdalla Hamdok, the Civil Prime Minister, on several occasions for a book that I co-wrote about the Sudan Revolution. The way the Constitution was written meant that Hamdok had limited power as Prime Minister. Burhan was the head of state and wanted to preserve the powers of SAF.

Hamdok often told me that the revolutions came in cycles. The abolition of Bashir in 2019 was a high point of revolution, and he saw his work as doing as much reform as possible before the low tide of the counter-revolution repels it.

Hamdok found that the 30 -year inheritance of dictatorship meant that Sudan’s political and economic models were dilapidated. But Burhan and Hemeti blocked the big reforms that Hamdok wanted to make.

Apart from Khartoum, violence has increased. Some parts of Sudan such as Darfur have seen a new cycle of conflict between ethnic groups orchestrated by RSF troops. More than 430,000 people were moved due to a conflict in Sudan, mainly in Darfur.

The soldiers did not hide the atrocities they committed against civilians. I remember drinking tea with a soldier aligned with the RSF at home in Darfur when he explained why he had recently participated in the fire in a village in another ethnic group.

The soldier estimated that a member of his tribe had been killed in an altercation, so that the forces aligned by the RSF took revenge by burning a village which had welcomed 30,000 people. At least 163 people died.

Tensions between SAF and RSF have increased. Burhan considered Hemeti and his RSF forces as usurpers who have come from Darfur who were not disciplined. Hemeti, on the other hand, believed that it was time for Darfur to direct Sudan.

Hamdok was about to start changing the economy when Burhan and SAF intervened. As we wrote in the book “The unfinished democracy of Sudan”, the potential success of a civil government was too much for Burhan. In October 2021, Hamdok was removed in a military coup.

After the state of October 2021, the United States and the United Nations pushed a worse version of the transitional constitution in Sudan. They argued that it was the best way to bring democracy.

The idea was to restart the transition period, but I and many others argued that it was short -sighted and would not work. The return to a government led by Burhan clearly was not going to inaugurate democracy. If the plan ended with a coup the first time, why would it work the second time?

Some activists have ceased to join in the United States and have come to see the United Nations mission as a roadblock towards democracy because of these policies. I felt sorry when I spoke with the best American and foreign diplomats, who also understood that international policy in Sudan would not work. They saw the faults but felt helpless to dissent and were forced to make decisions made many levels above them.

This preceded the hatching of this weekend clashes was a controversial part of the international policy that tried to unify the SAF and the RSF. The idea was to make a single army, but neither Hemeti nor Burhan wanted to abandon the power they had raised.

The army unification plan had not worked in similar contexts. It was a rehearsal of the 2013 and 2016 unification processes that took place in South Sudan with just as bloody results. Instead, the tenuous relationship between Burhan and Hemeti has boiled due to the pressure.

It can be easy to look at the recent history of “revolutions” in countries such as Myanmar, Tunisia, Egypt and Sudan and conclude that they end up turning around. I do not agree. I learned from Sudanese activists that the political fortune of a nation is an active battle.

We can one day hope that Sudan will see dreams of democracy come true. But at the moment, the Sudanese people just hopes to survive the day.

Sudan’s lesson is that a revolution is only the start of change, not the end.