Iraq’s Shia bloc divided over tactics after US rejects al-Maliki for PM
Najaf, Iraq – Leaders of the Iraqi Coordination Framework – the Shiite political coalition that came out on top The November legislative elections – are adamant that Nouri al-Maliki will be their candidate for Iraqi prime minister, even after threats from US President Donald Trump.
Trump warned in late January that if al-Maliki, who served as Iraqi prime minister between 2006 and 2014, returned to the post, the United States would stop aid to Iraq.
“If we are not there to help, Iraq has no chance of success, prosperity or freedom,” the US president wrote in a message published on his Truth Social website.
Trump and the U.S. administration view al-Maliki as part of Iran’s direct network of influence in Iraq and fear his return could undermine U.S. efforts to weaken Iran’s power in its western neighbor, including by limiting the reach of Iran-backed armed groups.
But even with increasing pressure, it appears that a majority of the most influential actors in the Coordination Framework are I’m not ready to give up on al-Maliki and are determined to find a way to advance his candidacy.
Divided coordination framework
The Coordination Framework (CF) is a coalition of Shiite political parties created in 2021. It represents the largest Shiite bloc in the Iraqi parliament.
The loose nature of the coalition that makes up the CF means that opinions on al-Maliki’s candidacy are varied, with some opposing it, others willing to bend to Trump’s will and switch support, and still others adamantly moving forward.
And it seems that the majority are in the latter camp.
The CF issued a statement on Saturday reiterating its support for al-Maliki. “The choice of prime minister is an exclusively Iraqi constitutional matter… free from foreign interference,” the statement added.
The statement reflects the position of various pro-Maliki forces within the CF, including former deputy speaker of parliament Mohsen al-Mandalewi; the Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amir; and the Supreme Islamic Council, led by cleric Humam Hamoudi.
Current Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, whose party received the most votes in the elections but who did not receive the CF nomination despite his party affiliation, also officially supports al-Maliki’s nomination, although he has not given up on the possibility of remaining prime minister himself.
Several of these factions performed well in last year’s parliamentary elections, including Al-Maliki’s Rule of Law Coalition, as well as Al-Sudani and Badr’s Coalition for Reconstruction and Development.
But, with the support of the Kurdish and Sunni parties, Al-Maliki’s Shiite skeptics have enough seats and enough votes to block the nomination if they wish.
These include prominent Shiite figures such as Qais al-Khazali, the leader of the Asaib Ahl al-Haq group; Ammar al-Hakim, the head of the National State Forces alliance; and former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.
Al-Hakim, whose parliamentary bloc has 18 seats, warned that there would be “economic repercussions” if al-Maliki was chosen, and added that “the public interest must take precedence over private interests.”
Meanwhile, the Victory Alliance, led by al-Abadi, issued a statement calling for “[the prioritisation of] the vital interests of the people given the exceptional circumstances experienced by Iraq and the region. » Al-Abadi’s group does not have a seat in Parliament, but retains an important voice within the CF.
Both statements contain a tacit acknowledgment of Iraq’s inability to resist American pressure and the need for an alternative candidate suited to the current reality.
Other obstacles
The CF therefore still has a difficult battle ahead to confirm al-Maliki as prime minister. Apart from Shia political groups, there are also opposition to al-Malikia controversial figure remembered negatively by many Iraqis, especially Sunnis.
There are also divisions within non-Shia groups that are also slowing down the nomination process.
According to the Iraqi Constitution, Parliament must first elect a president for Iraq, who then nominates the candidate from the largest parliamentary bloc to form the government. According to the Iraqi “muhasasa” system after 2003, which consists of dividing political functions by sect and ethnicity, the Prime Minister must be Shiite, the President Kurdish and the Speaker of Parliament Sunni.
So far, the main Kurdish factions – the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Bafel Talabani – have failed to agree on a consensus presidential candidate.
The CF is trying to negotiate an agreement between the Kurds. Recent efforts included a delegation led by al-Sudani meeting with both sides and a personal visit by al-Maliki to Barzani. But these initiatives have not yet come to fruition, and without a political agreement on the presidency, the process of appointing a Prime Minister will not be able to continue.
And even if the Kurds reach an agreement and do not obstruct al-Maliki, the CF will have to convince a long list of opponents of the former prime minister.
Among them is Mohammed al-Halbousi, former speaker of parliament and head of the Takadum party, who issued a statement before the US veto implicitly rejecting al-Maliki’s candidacy.
Collectively, anti-al-Maliki groups could muster about a third of the seats in Parliament, enough to prevent a presidential election session due to a lack of quorum.
To avoid this scenario, the CF should either restart internal negotiations regarding the next prime minister or appoint al-Sudani for a second term.
Al-Sudani’s party issued a statement on January 28 calling for “positive relations with the United States” – a move interpreted as an indirect argument for his renewal, drawing on his proven track record in managing relations with Washington during his term.
American leverage
The United States may no longer be the occupying power in Iraq, but it still has enormous economic leverage over the country.
Revenues from Iraq’s main export – oil – flow through the US Federal Reserve in New York.
Trump could decide not to renew an executive order, originally issued by President George W. Bush following the Iraq War, that gives legal protection to funds from oil revenues and prevents them from being frozen by Iraq’s creditors. The order was to be renewed as a formality when it expired in May.
If the US president decides not to renew the contract, creditors will seek to reclaim their funds and New York courts could issue rulings to freeze Iraqi assets. This would disrupt the transfer of funds needed to pay public salaries and support the economy for months or even years. Concretely, the Iraqi economy would stop.
This therefore explains why the pro-al-Maliki bloc within the CF is trying to persuade the US to change its position, rather than simply ignoring Trump.
A senior source within the CF’s Rule of Law coalition, who wished to remain anonymous in order to speak freely on the subject, told Al Jazeera that there were “attempts underway to convince the US administration to lift its veto on al-Maliki.”
Aqeel al-Fatlawi, the Rule of Law spokesman, also said he hoped the United States “will change its position in the coming period.”
While accusing regional states, notably Turkey and Syria, of being responsible for the US position towards him, al-Maliki himself has sought to soften his positions.
Syria has been one of the main points of difference between al-Maliki and the United States, which has supported Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa even as Iraq’s former prime minister denounced him for his past membership in al-Qaeda.
In a television interview Tuesday, al-Maliki used al-Sharaa’s full name, rather than the Syrian leader’s nom de guerre, “al-Jolani,” to try to emphasize that he was ready to move on from the past. Al-Maliki also attempted to soften his stance towards the Syrian government, directing his criticism at the former regime of deposed President Bashar al-Assad and its role in supporting “terrorism” in Iraq.
It remains to be seen whether these attempts will go far enough to appease the United States.
Reports indicate that the US special envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya, may have been removed from his post, although there is no official confirmation. His replacement would likely be Tom Barrack, currently US ambassador to Türkiye and special envoy to Syria.
The CF favors Savaya, who has been more supportive of using a more gradual approach to reducing the power of Iraqi Shiite militias, over Barrack, who is viewed more negatively by the CF for his role in weakening Hezbollah in Lebanon and his support for al-Sharaa in Syria.
The official announcement of a change could indicate where Trump’s thoughts are in the critical coming weeks — and whether the president will choose not to renew the U.S. guarantee to protect Iraq’s oil revenues in May.
