U.S.-Iran nuclear talks to resume in Oslo : NPR

Scott Simon, host:

The evaluations continue to change the damage caused to Iran’s nuclear installations after the Israeli attacks and attacks. The latter indicate that the Iranian nuclear program could be found for a year or two. Now, Iranian officials argue that they have the right to continue what they insist that a civil nuclear program. But all enrichment is currently a red line for the Trump administration, and discussions are scheduled for next week between Iran and the United States and Oslo.

Richard Nephew is principal researcher at Columbia University. He was a special assistant sent from Iran during the Biden administration and to the National Security Council and to the State Department during the Obama administration. Mr. Nephew, thank you very much for being with us.

Richard Nephew: Thank you for doing me.

Simon: In a room for Foreign Affairs, you have written that if Iran managed to hide and bury its highly enriched uranium stock, this would give them what you called escape options. What are these?

Nephew: therefore, fundamentally, when we talk about breakout, we are talking about the ability of Iran to produce enough material for its first nuclear weapon, then to be able to take this material and put it in components of the bomb. And if Iran had been able to hide, then find all the highly enriched uranium that they had produced previously, they would have a capacity quickly to move to nuclear weapons.

Simon: And I have to ask – this week, the Iranian president has signed a new law that suspends cooperation with the UN nuclear inspectors. It was a key aspect of Iran becoming a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. How do you read this decision?

Neveu: Well, I think of two levels. First, you know, I think Iranians fear that international inspectors have given information – you know, even simply publicly – it could have allowed Israeli and American military strikes. But secondly, you know, if the Iranians intend to try to run towards a bomb, ensuring that international inspectors are not there, there is one of the first steps you take.

Simon: You were part of the team that negotiated the nuclear agreement a decade ago. In recent weeks, we have seen a large part of the defense system of Iran damaged. Could this create an incentive for an agreement or simply the opposite?

Neveu: I mean, it could create an incentive for an agreement. But I think that the much more likely result – especially given the amount of nuclear program in Iran is that Iranians will say rather, ok, you know, we know, don’t particularly like the idea of ​​being attacked again. You know, what is the best way we can avoid this? And it is if we demonstrate that we have the capacity of nuclear weapons – something that they can do relatively quickly and at a lower cost, especially when considered with the amount of efforts necessary to rebuild their missile program, air defense systems. You know, that kind of things.

Simon: Well, and that may raise a global question. Did this recent war and the exchange of missiles simply persuade Iran’s leadership that what they need to stay in power is a nuclear weapon?

Nephew: Yes, this is my great concern. You know, look – when you decide to go to the military force to solve a nuclear problem, frankly, you would better not miss. And you must make sure that you can face all aspects of this nuclear program, because otherwise, what you have reported is, you know, you are defenseless. You know, we have the possibility of you surfing at will. You know, we have the capacity to attack your installations and your cities at will. And I think any state would look at this situation and say, well, we need something that will scare everyone so as not to do that. And it is above all the case if you are the Iranians, and if you are already in a way in the international system with the feeling that everyone is to get you. I really think that the point of view of the Iranian state at this stage must be, you know, try to ensure the survival of the regime, and that points in the direction of nuclear weapons.

Simon: At the same time, let me ask you questions about the effect of sanctions. President Trump, of course, left this nuclear agreement during his first mandate and imposed severe sanctions. Do they encourage Iran to continue negotiations and not have a nuclear development program?

Nephew: they could certainly, or at least sanction a help, right? So, at this stage, we have probably imposed sanctions on everything we can. There is always Iran’s ability to export a small amount of oil to China. It is, at this stage, in a way to maintain the Iranian economy afloat. But at the moment, the best incitement that we have to the Iranians not to continue nuclear weapons is to say, ok, we are ready to relieve a whole bunch of sanctions against you – you allow you to do much more international business, to allow money to sink, to allow reconstruction – and in exchange, to have conditions on the nuclear program, perhaps the missile program and other things. Basically, this is what the nuclear agreement in 2015 did.

Now we have a little advantage by the nuclear program having been seriously damaged. At the same time, Iranians now have a deep distrust of the United States. We have already withdrawn from an agreement. We have now joined a military attack. There is no clear indication that we can prevent the Israelis from attacking again if they wish. So you know, all these things are added to being a fairly difficult sale on the diplomatic side.

Simon: Well, and that raises this last question. Given your negotiation experience with Iranian officials, what type of transaction do you think possible? Or are conferences just for the show?

Nephew: I don’t think they are for the show, and I think the Iranians would agree. But I think that bringing them to accept any enrichment of uranium in the country forever and is probably beyond what we are able to achieve. You know, I think Iranians will insist on having at least a notional capacity. Whether they execute or not, this is a distinct question.

Simon: A notional capacity meaning the ability to develop nuclear energy for civilian uses.

Nephew: exactly, and it could be limited. It could be, you know, circumscribed. This can be limited in time – you know, you can start this program in 15 years when you have your first reactors under construction which can, you know, actually use enriched uranium. I can imagine this kind of agreement. But if not, it will be quite difficult, I think, to bring the Iranians to accept something now.

Simon: Richard Nephew in Columbia. Thank you very much for talking to us.

Neveu: Thank you.

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