A Plan B for space? On the risks of concentrating national space power in private hands

Private companies are no longer peripheral participants in U.S. space activities. They provide key services including launching and deploying satellites, transporting cargo and astronauts to the International Space Station and even sending landers to the Moon.

Commercial integration is now embedded in U.S. space policy and shapes national space strategy. As someone who studies space and international security, I have observed with admiration the extraordinary rise of commercial space – and with growing concern about the structural vulnerabilities it creates.

Access to space, particularly for crewed missions, remains heavily concentrated in a single company, SpaceX. While the United States has begun to develop alternatives, in operational reality this focus gives the company disproportionate leverage. If private power and public strategy diverged, would Washington have a credible plan B?

Trade integration is now official policy

On February 4, the House Science Committee approved the NASA Reauthorization Act of 2026, directing the agency to partner with U.S. commercial providers for operations in low Earth orbit, moon landings and the transition beyond the International Space Station. In critical areas such as lunar landers, the bill requires NASA to work with at least two commercial suppliers — a deliberate effort to avoid relying on a single company.

President Donald Trump’s December 2025 executive order expressed a similar preference for prioritizing commercial solutions in federal space activities and set a goal of attracting at least $50 billion in additional private investment in space by 2028. The U.S. Space Force’s 2024 Commercial Space Strategy also emphasizes speed and innovation through private partnerships.

Congress, the White House and the military are aligned: the government sets goals, then private industry builds – and increasingly operates – space systems. This change was bipartisan and explicit, and it produced results.

From cost savings to structural dominance

Its origins go back to a moment of vulnerability.

After the retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2011, the United States temporarily lost its independent human spaceflight capability. For nearly a decade, NASA relied on Russia’s Soyuz spacecraft, paying up to $80 million per astronaut seat, or about $4 billion in total.

NASA responded by deliberately turning to commercial suppliers through the Commercial Crew and Commercial Resupply programs. The goal was pragmatic: reduce costs, restore national launch capacity, and accelerate innovation. Under these programs, NASA provided funding and oversight while the companies built and operated their own systems.

It worked.

Launch costs have dropped by almost 70% in some cases. The pace of launches has accelerated.

SpaceX, founded by Elon Musk, has become central to this new architecture. Its Falcon 9 rocket now carries the majority – five out of six – of US launches into orbit. Since 2020, its Crew Dragon spacecraft has also regularly carried NASA astronauts, restoring the United States’ ability to put people into orbit after a 10-year hiatus.

In high-risk, capital-intensive space sectors, such as launches and crew transportation, development costs are enormous. Few companies can afford to be competitive. The company that first manufactures reliable rockets on a large scale, like SpaceX, wins contracts and consolidates its market share.

Efficiency and consolidation gave SpaceX dominance. This dominant position in turn creates leverage – not because the company is acting in bad faith, but because alternatives are limited.

Market concentration is not problematic in itself. But strategic infrastructure – such as access to space that underpins military operations, communications and critical national systems – does not constitute a normal consumer market. When a single company controls most launches or operates the only crewed spacecraft, its financial problems, technical setbacks, or leadership conflicts can disrupt the strategic capabilities of the entire country.

The Musk episode as a warning

In 2025, during a public dispute over government contracts and regulatory issues, Elon Musk briefly threatened to decommission the Dragon spacecraft – the vehicle NASA relies on to carry astronauts into orbit.

Musk quickly backed down from his threat and the missions continued. No astronauts were stranded, but the moment was telling.

At the time, Boeing’s Starliner capsule was still facing technical delays. There was no fully operational alternative ready to take on the mission immediately. Even a short-lived threat revealed the extent to which America’s access to space was now tied to the stability of a single company – and arguably a single individual.

So, is there a plan B?

A credible plan B for space does not mean abandoning commercial partnerships. This means ensuring that alternatives exist.

Historically, to guarantee access to space, it was necessary to have several means of reaching orbit. Today, this principle extends to crew transportation, lunar logistics, satellite services and data infrastructure.

Congress seems to be aware of this. The current NASA reauthorization bill requires the agency to diversify its suppliers in key programs, particularly lunar landers. The intention is to deliberately build redundancy into the system, making it more resilient to potential shocks.

But layoffs are expensive. Maintaining parallel systems, supporting multiple providers, and preserving internal government expertise requires long-term funding and political commitment. Markets alone are unlikely to ensure diversification in these costly sectors.

In February 2026, Congress decided to legislate for greater diversification of American space strategy. The intention is clear, but the timeline is not. It remains unclear when or if the bill will become law.

For now, U.S. access to space, particularly for crewed missions, remains heavily dependent on SpaceX. Plan B exists on paper, but in reality it is still under construction.

Strategic permanence in space requires options

The stakes will only grow.

As the United States expands into cislunar space – the region between Earth and the Moon – and seeks to establish a lasting presence on the Moon, its dependence on commercial suppliers will increase.

Commercial dynamism has revitalized U.S. leadership in space, but it has also exposed structural vulnerabilities. Sustainable systems rarely depend on a single center of power. In Federalist No. 51, James Madison, the fourth president of the United States, argued that stable political orders require competing forces, so “ambition must be made to counteract ambition.” His vision was political, but logic can apply. Economic resilience comes from balance, not concentration.

The United States chose a commercial path in space, and that choice has generated extraordinary gains. But permanence beyond Earth will require a deliberate balance: multiple providers of essential services, overlapping capabilities, and alternatives robust enough to absorb shocks.

Commercial space can support American leadership in the new space age, but only if access to orbit, and beyond, never relies on a single, indispensable company.

This article is republished from The Conversation, an independent, nonprofit news organization that brings you trusted facts and analysis to help you make sense of our complex world. It was written by: Svetla Ben-Itzhak, Johns Hopkins University

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Svetla Ben-Itzhak does not work for, consult, own shares in, or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond her academic appointment.