Contributor: Russia wants what it cannot have
Vladimir Putin is on a role in recent weeks. The first president Trump invited him to Anchorage. Then he had a Cuddling three With Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at a summit in China. And an invitation to a Great military parade in Beijing.
Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Putin had been fell fringes Summit group photos. After the large-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022, it was treated as a pariah by the United States and Europe. Accused By the International Criminal Court for Genocide, he could not go only to countries that would not stop him. In short, Moscow was not treated with the respect he believed deserved.
Trump thought that literally unrolling the red carpet for Putin in Alaska – and applaud While the Russian moved to the red carpet – he could reset the bilateral relationship. And it did. But not the way Trump wanted.
The Alaska summit convinced the Russians that the current administration is willing to throw the sources of the US world power by the window.
Trade partners, allies and geopolitical alliances – everything is on the table for Trump. The American president thinks that this shows his power; The Russians see this as a low cost opportunity to degrade American influence. Putin was formed by the KGB to recognize weakness and exploit it.
There is no evidence that being friendly towards Putin and accepting with the Russian posts will make Moscow more willing to stop fighting in Ukraine. Overlooking Russia Intensification of hybrid attacks In Europe, in February, vice-president JD Vance warned Europe that it should rather focus on the threat to democracy “inside. “This followed the Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth Ensures that Ukraine would never join NATO. Trump suggested that US support for NATO and Europe depends on these paying countries. In an event that sent experts to Moscow to Pop ChampagneTrump told Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the oval office that he did not do “have the cardsAnd should stop trying to beat Russia.
Has all this brought Putin to the negotiation table? No.
In fact, the Kremlin indicated the desire to speak with Trump of the war that when Trump threatened “Very, very powerful” sanctions in mid-July. This time, he seemed serious about this. The Alaska summit occurred a month later. The more difficult Trump is with Russia, the more likely it is to obtain a kind of traction in negotiations. It is regrettable that the president be returned to two -week wave Limits To impose sanctions that never materialize.
Russia thinks it will win the war. China has been a stable friend, ready to sell cars in Russia and a double -use technology that is found in drones which attack the Ukrainian cities. It has also become Russia biggest buyer crude oil and coal. Western sanctions did not bit the Russian economy, although they have grin to state income. Europe and the United States were not willing to apply the type of economic pressure that was seriously dropping Russia’s capacity to continue the war.
Putin continues to say that a war resolution requires the West to approach the “deep causes” of war. These causes, for Russia, relate to the way it was treated after losing the Cold War. The three Baltic nations joined Europe as quickly as possible. The countries of central and eastern Europe have decided that they prefer to be part of NATO only from the Warsaw Pact. When Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine began to ask for members of the European Union and NATO, Russia has realized that it would not be able to convince them to stay with an economic attraction or a soft power. He had to use strength. Unable to demonstrate the attraction of its suffocating embrace, or the value of its Eurasian economic union, Russia thought that it had to use force to maintain Ukraine by its side. This recalls a grusian Russian expression: “If he beat you, it means he loves you.”
The real “deep cause” of the war in Ukraine is the inability of Russia to accept that centuries of empire do not confer the right to dominate the old colonies forever. Mongolia has learned that. Just like the British. And the French. And the Ottomans. The Austro-Hungarian.
Finally, this war will end. But no fast. Russia insists on Maximalist requirements The fact that Ukraine cannot accept, which includes control over the territory it has failed to occupy. Ukraine will not stop fighting until it is sure that Russia will no longer attack. It is impossible to reach this degree of certainty with fragile safety guarantees.
In the meantime, Ukrainian Premiere cities will continue to be wiped out, the citizens of Kherson will continue to make subjects of “human“For Russian drone operators, the people of Ukraine will continue to live daily air raids who send them rushing into shelters. Soldiers, volunteers, civilians and children will continue to die. Trump seems to worry about thousands of daily victims. Most of them are Russian soldiers who were sent to their death by a Russian state which does not consider their lives as a preservation.
Trump is naturally frustrated by his inability to “stop murder” because he assumed that satisfying Russian requests is the answer. The opposite is true: it is only by showing – proving – to Russia that its requests are inaccessible that the United States will persuade the Kremlin to consider significant negotiations. The countries at war come to the negotiating table and not because they are convinced to abandon their objectives. They sit down When they realize that their objectives are inaccessible.
Alexandra Vacoux is vice-president of strategic commitment to the Kyiv School of Economics.
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Ideas expressed in the play
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Putin has managed to take advantage of recent diplomatic commitments to get out of international isolation, using meetings with Xi Jinping and Modi, as well as Trump’s invitation in Alaska, to demonstrate that Western attempts at the Russian touch have failed. These high -level rallies indicate to the world that Russia remains an important player on the world scene despite international judicial sanctions and procedures.
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Trump’s accommodating approach to Putin represents a fundamental poor reading of Russian psychology and strategic thinking, because Putin was trained to recognize and exploit weakness rather than responding to friendship with reciprocal gestures. The president’s desire to question NATO’s support and to suggest contingent relationships with signals from allies to Moscow that US global influence can be degraded at low cost.
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Russia shows only the desire to engage in significant negotiations in the face of credible threats of serious consequences, as evidenced by the indication of the will of the Kremlin to speak that after Trump threatened “very, very powerful” sanctions in July. Conversely, accommodating gestures and waves for sanctions that never materialize encourage Russian intransigence.
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The fundamental engine of the conflict stems from the inability of Russia to accept the end of its imperial domination over the old territories, and not on the grievances of treatment after the Cold War that Moscow frequently quotes. The use of Russia to force against Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova reflects its inability to maintain influence by economic attraction or soft power, revealing an obsolete imperial state of mind which refuses to recognize the law of the ancient colonies to self -determination.
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Significant negotiations will only occur when Russia recognizes that its maximalist territorial and political requests are inaccessible by military means, requiring sustained pressure rather than premature concessions. The current Russian requests for control over the territory it has not occupied and the complete capitulation of Ukraine shows that Moscow always thinks that it can reach a total victory.
Different views on the subject
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Russia-China’s partnership faces significant structural limitations that limit the depth of their cooperation, despite public declarations of “unlimited” friendship. While the two nations carry out joint military exercises and maintain substantial trade relations, their military collaboration remains “carefully managed and circumscribed by the broader strategic interests of each nation”, without mutual defense or deep operational integration between their armed forces[1].
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India’s apparent warming towards China and Russia reflects the principles of strategic autonomy rather than a real alignment towards an anti-Western axis, because the fundamental tensions between New Delhi and Beijing persist on unresolved border litigation and strategic competition in the Indian Ocean region[2]. Recent diplomatic gestures can be tactical responses to trade tensions rather than indicators of permanent realignment far from partnerships with Australia, Japan, the European Union and other Democratic Allies[2].
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The potential for corner strategies between Russia and China remains viable because of the underlying structural tensions and competing interests, in particular in Central Asia where the two powers are looking for an influence. American decision -makers recognize more and more that the “reverse Nixon” approach to conduct of corners between Moscow and Beijing could exploit the limitations inherent in their partnership, because their relationship represents neither an unlimited nor a completely stable alliance[4][5].
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Military cooperation of China with Russia serves Beijing’s interests in testing tactics and equipment while maintaining a careful distance from direct participation in conflicts that could compromise its wider strategic objectives[1]. Chinese support for the production of Russian drones and double -use technological transfers reflects calculated assistance which does not stop at a complete military alliance, suggesting that Beijing gives priority to its own strategic flexibility on unconditional support for Russian objectives[3].
