How Europe Can Respond to Trump’s Greenland Imperialism

It’s interesting, but it’s not exactly ideological. It’s because he sees European weakness and wants to exercise power.

It’s true. When Trump came to power, there were some very interesting analyzes done by historians trying to understand Trump’s worldview. What they understood was that, throughout his career, President Trump firmly believed that there was something seriously wrong, and that after the end of World War II, countries like Germany and Japan had managed to do so well. According to him, it made no sense that the United States, the United Kingdom, and even the Soviet Union won the war, but the Germans and Japanese were doing so well. And then it turned into “America won, so why do Europeans live better than us? Why do they have better cars?” Etc.

And I believe that this worldview has stuck with him. Furthermore, he does not understand what the European Union is. Europeans believe in win-win scenarios. They believe that it really is possible to find a way to compromise. If there is a religion in European politics, it is that of compromise and consensus. And then there’s someone like Trump, who’s not interested in that.

I was talking with an American analyst, a colleague of mine, and he made an observation that I found profound, but which will probably seem trivial to you. He said President Trump has had a successful business career in many ways, but he hasn’t had spectacular success in the business he tried, which was casinos. The problem is that in the casino business, to win, you have to try to create the illusion that others are winning.

I think it’s pretty good. I don’t find it trivial, actually.

It felt like a Crimean moment. So much of the trust in the United States was based on the fact that whatever our differences, Europe can count on the Americans when it comes to Russia, and now no one believes that anymore.

When you talk about a moment in Crimea, I assume you are referring to Russia’s capture of Crimea twelve years ago, and that was just the beginning of their plans on Ukraine, and that Trump’s desire to seize Greenland could also be a first step. Is that what you meant?

No. In 2012 and 2013, before the invasion of Crimea, President Putin’s popularity had declined somewhat and protests took place in Russia. And then all of a sudden you have a large majority of support that emerges after the annexation of Crimea. And, in my opinion, President Trump also believes that if suddenly, on the night of July 4, 2026, Greenland becomes part of the United States, then America will understand how big it has become. And I think that really scares a lot of people in Europe, because they imagine that this will be a policy that others will want to emulate.

I think Trump is totally wrong about how Americans would react to this, but that might not matter either. And that in itself is scary enough. Are there any exits that you see?

I believe there will be a group of countries, including those in Eastern Europe, that will say, “Look, let’s talk seriously. We’re going to recognize the strategic dimension of Greenland, but what we can’t talk about is that America owns it.” And here President Trump basically has an option. Either he’ll say, “I achieved what I wanted to do. I never wanted to own it. It was just a deal, and now we’re going to, for example, increase our military presence there, or it’ll be our companies that develop some of Greenland’s rare earth resources.” Something like this can happen. But I have a feeling that right now, President Trump is not interested in that. It became too symbolic for him.

The other compromise option is for the Europeans to keep Greenland and for us to give Trump the chairmanship of the Nobel Prize committee so he can win the next Nobel Prize. But, for now, I think the Europeans will probably target some American products. And we will see what happens with the anti-coercion instrument in the future.

You mentioned earlier that the Europeans thought Trump really cared about building a coalition against China. But it now seems possible that one of the long-term effects of a potential major rift between America and Europe would be to provide an opening to China.

Totally. It is THE history. And I also believe that the Europeans are still clinging to the hope that a part of the American elite – the financial elite but also the military elite – will go to President Trump and say: “Look, you don’t like Europe. And, of course, the Europeans are idiots as you told us, but they are idiots that we need.” If you look at global public opinion, people believe that China is on the rise, but what is more interesting is that they have stopped fearing that. And I think that’s something that President Trump has slightly underestimated.

And then the question arises NATO. Many Europeans began to question whether their belief in NATO begins to resemble the French belief in the famous Maginot line. Before World War II, the French created this “fortification” on the French-German border, which gave the feeling of being defended, but it turned out that this was not the case. So, as a result, this destabilization of Europe could have far-reaching consequences. This is why some Europeans still believe that at some point, the Trump administration will realize strategically that this war is not worth it.

I hope you’re right, but you said Trump may have “underestimated” the effect all this would have on China’s potential influence in the future. I don’t think it was underestimated or overestimated. I don’t think that fits into the equation of what he’s thinking. The notion of misguided national interest is one thing. Many presidents have had them. The notion of a person having no conception of the national interest is perhaps closer to reality.

No, you’re right. And do you know what the real risk is for Europe? The real risk for Europe is that Greenland becomes Trump’s obsession. Because one of the important characteristics of President Trump is that he has strong opinions, but he cannot maintain his attention for very long on the same issue. And if this basically becomes an obsession, then the nature of the change in the transatlantic relationship will be really, really dramatic. ♦