Israel unprepared for potential terror attack on central light rail, comptroller says

The audit found that there are no legal requirements for major transport projects to meet police technical and operational safety standards during the planning, launch or tender stages.

There are significant gaps in preparedness for terror attacks on the Dan area light rail, State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman said Tuesday, as the State Comptroller’s Office released a new report on the state of security in Israel.

Englman framed the findings harshly, saying that “security reports should keep government ministers up at night,” noting that they also directly affect “the security of Israeli citizens.”

Since October 7, he noted, the obligation to address the deficiencies identified by his office “has only grown,” with “serious deficiencies … in a wide range of areas.”

Between August 2024 and January 2025, the Comptroller’s Office conducted an in-depth study of the country’s preparedness for a terrorist attack on the Dan Region Light Rail, examining the systems and institutions responsible for protecting the Red Line, the country’s most densely used transit corridor.

The audit covered the Israel Police, NTA Metropolitan Mass Transit (NTA), Ministry of Defense, National Emergency Management Authority (NEMA), National Security Council (NSC), Ministry of Transportation, Fire and Rescue Authority, Magen David Adom (MDA), Privacy Authority and Ministry of National Security.

Investigators also conducted field inspections along the line and made additional checks with the Shin Bet (Israeli Security Agency). However, cyberterrorism scenarios were excluded.

Light rail safety audit reveals major deficiencies, understaffing

One of the main findings of the audit is the absence of a legally defined and empowered authority to determine or approve the victim scenario of a terrorist attack on the tram. In the existing “extreme scenario”, such an attack would result in massive losses. Yet, despite the seriousness of the threat, there is no normative designation of responsibilities.

In practice, NEMA created the scenario based on operational research carried out by the police and the NTA, and believes that the Ministry of Transport must approve it. At the same time, the NSC maintains that the ministry should lead all national transportation infrastructure security planning.

The Ministry of Transport rejected NEMA’s September 2019 scenario as too high in terms of projected losses. Yet by the time the audit closed in January 2025, five years later, it had produced no expert alternative.

This, the State Comptroller’s Office noted, persists even though the ministry is responsible for Israel’s transportation infrastructure and funds the buildup of its forces. Police told Englman that after Oct. 7, they reassessed national terrorism baselines but determined no changes were necessary.

The audit also found that there are no legal requirements for major transport projects to meet police technical and operational security standards during the planning, inception or tender phases, even though the police are the legally designated security authority and must approve certain permitted public facilities.

At the same time, the police force still has not completed the process of anchoring its subway safety standards as a binding national standard, although efforts began in early 2023.

Another gap concerns preparation for a chemical terrorist attack. Although a designated security unit has national responsibility for responding to chemical incidents and attacks occurring internationally, there is no regulated consultation process with this unit during the planning or tendering phases of large public infrastructure projects involving enclosed underground spaces such as train stations.

There is also no binding obligation to implement the unit’s recommendations.

Understaffing of the NTA security force emerged as a critical weakness in the report’s findings. Even before the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas war in 2023, and more sharply thereafter, the number of security agents was steadily declining.

Several teams were operating below standard staffing requirements, and in two cases they fell below the minimum threshold, according to the report. Guard refresher training has also declined, including hand-to-hand combat refreshers not covered by reserve service.

With two additional light rail lines in the Dan area and a future subway system on the horizon, the report warns that the deficit is expected to widen as demand for qualified guards increases.

Because mass transit systems carry extremely high volumes of passengers, police and the NTA told the state comptroller’s office that there needs to be more exploration into the use of advanced safety technologies. The report also identified gaps in casualty evacuation procedures.

One of the most persistent failures noted by the controller involves underground communications systems. Although it appeared in several previous audits, some released nearly a decade ago, the report found that MDA’s radio network still cannot interface with police or fire and rescue systems in underground environments.

This leaves MDA teams unable to coordinate with other responders during an incident, while underground units lack portable radios; portable devices are only available in ambulances. This means that if cellular networks collapse, responders will only be able to communicate physically or through a third party.

The comptroller reiterated long-standing calls, dating back to 2016, for a national underground training center that could simulate the full range of underground infrastructure and train all emergency agencies, police, MDA, fire and rescue, home front command, counterterrorism units and light rail employees.

Although transportation, national security, finance, police, fire and rescue officials collectively recognized these needs as early as 2016, no such facility has been built, and construction has not even begun, as of January 2025.

The monitor reported some positive findings: the audit revealed strong cooperation between the police and the NTA, particularly in joint training and routine security operations, cooperation which became particularly critical after the opening of the Red Line and even more so after October 7.

Officials from the State Comptroller’s Office also visited the NTA training center at moshav Tal Shahar, where Red Line guards undergo initial training and periodic preparation exercises.

They praised the modern infrastructure, which includes a dedicated train car for scenario-based exercises. However, the site is not an underground facility or a national training center; it only serves NTA guards, whose role is to provide immediate frontline response during a terrorist incident.

Englman concluded that the Department of Transportation must convene all agencies involved in formulating the current casualty scenario, study the research behind it and seek clarification if necessary.

He further asked the police, the Ministry of National Security, the Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of Finance to undertake comprehensive work on the National Guard shortage, calling it “a national challenge requiring urgent action”, and to fill the personnel gap once this analysis is completed.