Trump may be a liability and Orbán is gone, but Europe’s far right is not in decline | Cas Mudde
VIktor Orbán’s crushing defeat in last month’s Hungarian elections sparked an explosion of democratic optimism. Democrats around the world are learning from the results and speculating about the decline of the far right. There is simultaneously a consensus that Donald Trump has moved from being an inspiration to being a “liability” for the global far right.
Even though Orbán’s fall has great symbolic meaning and important consequences for European politics (see the EU-Ukraine deal), we must be very careful not to give it too much importance for three reasons.
First, when it comes to lessons on how to defeat so-called illiberal democrats, we must keep in mind that Orbán was in power for an exceptionally rare 16 years. This allowed him to oversee not only a political transformation of Hungary, but also an economic and societal transformation. His defeat is not a rejection of his far-right policies, and certainly not of his anti-immigration policies (which are widely supported by the new Prime Minister, Peter Magyar), but of the country’s dire economic situation and allegations of massive corruption under the Orbán regime.
The victory of Magyar, who will be sworn in on May 9, is not so much an endorsement of his policies as the consequence of his tireless campaign outside the traditional bastions of the opposition, in the most strategic constituencies, in an extremely disproportionate electoral system. Although this strategy could prove equally successful in majoritarian systems like France, the United Kingdom and the United States, it would have much less impact in proportional systems like the Netherlands. Yet, as Zohran Mamdani showed in New York, popular mobilization and old-fashioned knocking on doors still matter.
Second, although the European far right has lost its unofficial leader, it is not in decline. Of course, other far-right parties have also recently lost elections (in Bulgaria, for example). or power (Netherlands). But far-right parties remain in government in several EU member states (Czech Republic, Italy) and are leading the polls in several others (Austria, France). The fact is that the far right is here to stay, and many of its parties are as established as the (old) “mainstream” parties. And, as with other parties, their electoral support fluctuates and is affected by internal and external factors, such as corruption, infighting and government crises.
Most importantly, the mainstreaming and normalization of far-right actors and ideas continues unabated. Giorgia Meloni’s Italy has become a go-to place of pilgrimage for politicians trying to portray themselves as tough on immigration – from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to Keir Starmer. The European People’s Party (EPP), the Europe-wide political alliance of center-right parties, is now openly collaborating with far-right parties to pass legislation in the European Parliament, while continuing to openly flirt with Meloni.
And this collaboration is not limited to immigration. By the 2024 European elections, the EPP was embracing far-right skepticism about the climate crisis and environmental protection, aiming to prevent disgruntled farmers from moving to the far right.
Third, it is true that Trump is currently “toxic” to the far right, even if this did not have a significant effect on the Hungarian elections. But this question of toxicity is not static. Simply put, when the US president threatens to occupy Greenland and leave NATO, or to introduce tariffs on the EU, he constitutes a liability for far-right European parties. But when he is primarily linked to anti-establishment and immigration policies, or his alleged fight against “the swamp” and “wokeness”, his star rises again among the far right – even if European far-right voters are generally rather skeptical of Trump. Therefore, the much-celebrated “break” between Meloni and Trump is strategic rather than ideological and, therefore, will be temporary rather than permanent.
But Trump is helping the European far right simply by being president of the United States. Because every time the president of the most powerful country in the world says something, it is by definition not politically marginal. Moreover, much of what he says, no matter how extreme, is normalized and rationalized in the discourse of mainstream media and politicians – just look at the obsequiousness of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. This means that similar arguments become more difficult to marginalize in the European context.
Worse still, because Trump their behavior is so extreme and often seems unbalanced that it is very easy for Europe’s far-right leaders to appear “moderate” in comparison – after all, they are “not as bad as Trump.” This endless comparison and the inability to accept that there can be different shades of far-right helps savvy politicians like Meloni. By not acting aggressively, erratically and loudly like Trump (or, in her own country, Matteo Salvini), she is taken for a mere “conservative” rather than a radical right politician. It is thus aided by the implicit sexism of many observers, who assume that women are less extremist and less ideological than men.
All of this takes nothing away from the Magyars or the wonderful Hungarian people who opposed and ousted Orbán – and especially the many left-wing Hungarians who voted for a right-wing politician to save democracy. Nor is it a question of denying the symbolic significance of Orbán’s defeat. We should really celebrate this important victory. But we must do this without generalizing or simplifying, to ensure that similar electoral victories can be achieved in Europe and the United States.
