We Must Stop China from Stealing Our Military Secrets
After the Trump administration’s successful capture of Nicolas Maduro, much was written about the Venezuelan leader’s cooperation with China, from intelligence sharing to military access and technology transfers in the Western Hemisphere, and why the Trump administration was right to act against him.
But while many political analysts focus on China’s influence abroad, many pay far less attention to the ease with which the Chinese Communist Party can access sensitive information here, often because we fail to enforce our own rules governing electronic devices in secure facilities.
Ken Calvert, chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, points out that when the United States won the Cold War, it was clear that we had the most powerful military in the world and that no one else seemed able to catch up.
However, in just 30 years, China has almost achieved it. The country has built the world’s second-largest economy and is using that economic power to finance a military buildup faster and more sophisticated than anything we’ve seen before.
China’s rise does not come only from innovation. Both economically and militaryly, it was built on the systematic theft of American commercial and military secrets.
Developing designs, collecting data, creating production systems, and creating intellectual property is expensive and time-consuming. A country can move forward much more quickly if it can “borrow” this work from others and focus solely on production. This is what China has been doing for decades, and its ability to do so has only grown over the past decade thanks to digital technology, particularly cellphones.
Twenty years ago, espionage focused on stealing a handful of documents. Today, that involves the theft and transmission of massive files, comprehensive weapons manuals, and thousands of photographs of U.S. military equipment used on U.S. bases and ships, making it easier for China to move straight into production.
In 2025 alone, there have been at least ten public cases of individuals accused or convicted of spying for China using their cell phones. These cases represent only the tip of the iceberg. Many others are resolved discreetly when dealing with classified documents, to avoid revealing sensitive information in open court.
As cell phones become more powerful and ubiquitous, measures to prevent their presence in sensitive establishments have not kept pace. Many government sites post signs saying “No unauthorized electronic devices allowed.”
Unfortunately, these policies are often treated the same way speed limits are treated on American highways: enforced only when enforcement is visible. In establishments without real control mechanisms, people bring phones in with impunity, assuming it is acceptable because they have no malicious intent. Few consider that their devices could be compromised or that widespread noncompliance provides cover for someone with hostile intentions.
According to retired CIA executive Rodney Alto, fewer than 10 percent of intelligence agencies that ban electronic devices have a mechanism to detect them. Where detection systems exist, experience shows that people still attempt to introduce unauthorized devices, proving that unprotected facilities are likely to admit thousands of compromising devices without ever knowing it.
This partly explains how China was able to catch up so quickly. As the United States develops new weapons and defense systems, China is learning from stolen copies of our work and struggling to keep pace.
This needs to be fixed – and now.
China’s military modernization is accelerating as its demands against Taiwan intensify. Taiwan produces almost all of the world’s most advanced semiconductor chips, supplying companies such as NVIDIA, Intel, IBM and others, placing the center of advanced computing just 185 miles from mainland China.
At the same time, the United States is preparing the largest accumulation of military intellectual property in history. Programs such as the Golden Dome, the Columbia-class submarine, the B-21 Raider, nuclear triad modernization, and hypersonic weapons rely on technologies that do not yet exist. This gives us a rare opportunity to protect these secrets before they are created and before they can be stolen.
We know that extraordinary technologies are coming. Now is the time to impose a government-wide ban on unauthorized electronic devices in sensitive facilities, backed by mandatory detection systems, real penalties for violations, and sustained oversight from Congress. This is the only way to ensure that we do not continue to make China’s plans for them.
Fred Fleitz is a former chief of staff for Trump’s National Security Council and a former CIA analyst. He is currently vice president of the Center for American Security at the America First Policy Institute.
